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SOCIETY VERSUS THE LAWYERS: THE
STRANGE HIERARCHY OF PROTECTIONS
OF THE "NEW" CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
GILDA M. TUONI*
In 1984, the American Bar Association (the "ABA") promulgated
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules").'
Thereafter, the majority of states adopted the Model Rules in
whole or in part.2 Among the Model Rules adopted in 1984 was
Model Rule 1.6 concerning the subject of maintaining client confi-
dences.3 Model Rule 1.6 protects from disclosure information re-
lated to a lawyer's representation of a client with some excep-
tions. 4 Under Model Rule 1.6(a), a lawyer may reveal confidential
client information if the client consents after consultation or if the
disclosures are "impliedly authorized in order to carry out the rep-
resentation."5 Under Model Rule 1.6(b), a lawyer may reveal confi-
dential information, relating to the representation of a client, if
the lawyer reasonably believes it necessary to:
Prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or sub-
stantial bodily harm;6 or to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and
the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the cli-
ent was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceed-
* B.A., University of New Mexico; J.D., Boston College Law School; LL.M., Harvard Law
School. At the time this article was written, the author was an Associate Professor of Law,
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. She currently is a Visiting Scholar at Harvard
Law School and engaging in graduate studies in Ethics at the Harvard Divinity School.
Professor Tuoni would like to thank Dean Gerald McLaughlin, Professors Dan Selmi and
Jan Costello, and Ms. Denai Burbank of Loyola for their support in the completion of this
article.
1 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1984) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
2 As of this writing, most of the states, including the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands, have adopted some form of the MODEL RULES.
3 MODEL RULES Rule 1.6.
4 MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(a).
5 Id.
6 MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(1).
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ing concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.7
Thus, under the Model Rules, a lawyer may reveal confidential
client information only with client consent, or if impliedly author-
ized; if reasonably necessary to prevent only certain types of
crime; or, if reasonably necessary for the lawyer to succeed in a
controversy with a client or to defend himself or herself. These
provisions have, to a large extent, restricted a lawyer's prior dis-
cretion to reveal confidential client information when necessary to
prevent the commission of many types of crime other than that of
imminent bodily harm or death. As a result, the interests of soci-
ety and individuals, historically given greater protection under
former American Bar Association ethical codes,8 have suffered
while protections for clients and lawyers have been strengthened.
Concurrently, Model Rule 3.3, regarding candor to a tribunal, a
lawyer's ability, indeed obligation, to reveal confidential client in-
formation if the lawyer learns that a client used the lawyer's serv-
ices to commit a fraud on a court is enlarged. Model Rule 3.3(a)(4)
provides that "[i]f a lawyer has offered material evidence and
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable re-
medial measures."9
Such "remedial measures" are explained in the commentary to
Model Rule 3.3.10 The comment provides, in part:
If perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered, the
advocate's proper course ordinarily is to remonstrate with the
client confidentially. If that fails, the advocate should seek to
withdraw if that will remedy the situation. If withdrawal will
not remedy the situation or is impossible, the advocate should
make disclosure to the court.'1
These Model Rule provisions, requiring the disclosure of client
confidential information concerning fraud on a court, depart sub-
stantially from prior rules regarding the protection of client confi-
dences. Thus, the courts, along with clients and lawyers, have
7 MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(2).
8 Compare MODEL RuLEs (rules should be interpreted with reference to purposes of legal
representation) with CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics (1908 & 1928) (lawyer should assist
in maintaining integrity and integrity of legal profession) and MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1970) (lawyers play vital role in preservation of society).
9 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3(a)(4).
10 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3 cmt.
11 Id.
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benefitted from enhanced protections under the Model Rules in
the area of client confidentiality. In sum, the Model Rules give
greater protection to clients who announce future criminal con-
duct, increase the ability of lawyers to protect themselves by en-
larging the number of instances in which lawyers may reveal cli-
ent confidences where necessary, and require mandatory
disclosure of client information which reveals the commission of
fraud on a court during a lawyer's representation when other ef-
forts to correct the fraud have not worked.
This Article analyzes these changes in the context of a confiden-
tiality "battleground," which has pitted lawyers against society
through the rather strange hierarchy of protections which have
evolved under the Model Rules. The Article presents a series of
hypotheticals which are based, in whole or in part, on recent
cases. Through analysis of these hypotheticals, the history of pro-
tections afforded to clients, lawyers, courts, and the public
through the American Bar Association Canons of Ethics (the
"ABA Canons"), 12 the American Bar Association's Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (the "ABA Code"),13 the Model Rules,14
as well as the ethical opinions and court decisions interpreting
these professional conduct provisions will be revealed.15 In conclu-
sion, this Article proposes a rethinking of client confidentiality. A
remodeled design of client confidentiality is suggested which
would, if adopted, afford society and individuals greater protec-
tions. The proposed protections would be consistent with those
given to clients, lawyers, and the courts, and yet they would not
substantially change the adversary system as we know it.
I. THE HYPOTHETICALS
Ponder the following hypothetical situations:
A. Hypothetical One
A lawyer represents a client, defendant A, who has a codefend-
ant, defendant B. The defendants are arrested for the murder of a
security guard during a bank robbery. A tells his lawyer that he
12 See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHicS (1908 & 1928).
13 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1970).
14 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT (1984).
15 See ABA Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics (1967).
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has never seen defendant B before the arraignment of the two. In
fact, A tells his lawyer that he alone committed the crime with
which both defendants are charged. The lawyer for defendant A
never says anything to the authorities or to the lawyer for defend-
ant B about A's statements concerning B's innocence. Several law
enforcement personnel tell the police that they do not believe de-
fendant B was involved. The police do nothing about these
statements.
At trial, both defendants are convicted of first degree murder,
with the possibility of the death penalty or life in prison as poten-
tial sentences. The jury comes back with a sentence of life in
prison. Just before he dies, defendant A tells a prison chaplin that
defendant B was not involved in the crime. Neither the chaplin
nor defendant A's lawyer say, or do anything regarding defendant
B. Several years later, a motion is made by a new court-appointed
counsel for defendant B requesting that the court release A's law-
yer from his obligation of confidentiality still owed to his deceased
client. The motion is denied. It is only after defendant A's rela-
tives are located by B's new lawyers, and the relatives agree to
release A's lawyer from the confidentiality obligation, that the
court permits the lawyer to testify as to defendant A's prior excul-
patory statements concerning defendant B. Thereafter, the law
enforcement personnel and the chaplin also testify. The result: B
is finally released from prison, having been incarcerated for a dec-
ade and a half for a crime he did not commit. 16
B. Hypothetical Two
X tells the police that after attending a childbirth instruction
class at a hospital with his pregnant wife, he and his wife, who
were white, were accosted in their automobile by an African-
American male in a predominantly African-American area of the
city. X stated that the assailant robbed and shot them. The wife
died shortly thereafter and the couple's infant, delivered by emer-
gency Caesarean section, died a few weeks later.
16 See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 239 N.E.2d 5 (Mass. 1968) (George Reissfelder con-
victed of first-degree murder in course of robbery), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1056 (1969); see
also Ted Gest, When the Nightmare of False Arrest Comes True, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 17, 1984, at 45 (one-half of 1% of all arrests are "illegitimate"); Imprisoned in the '66
Killing, He Goes Free in Boston, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1982, at A10 (Mr. Reissfelder spent
years incarcerated at Walpole State Prison a crime he did not commit).
[Vol. 8:439
NEW CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
The violent murders set off an uproar in the city and around the
country. The city, already divided by racial strife, become the
center of an intensified national focus on racial tension. The po-
lice conduct aggressive and often random stops of African-Ameri-
can males in the city who fit the assailant's description. X ulti-
mately identifies the assailant in a police line-up. The police
obtain incriminating statements from others who claim the identi-
fied assailant has bragged about the crimes.
A number of weeks later a lawyer is contacted by X. X appar-
ently learned that his brother had told the police that X, not the
identified assailant, actually shot his wife and himself. X dis-
cusses the matter at some length with the lawyer. The next day,
X commits suicide by jumping off a bridge. The entire city is out-
raged by the gross fraud perpetrated by X on his family, the city as
a whole, and in particular, on the African-American community.
The lawyer is subpoenaed to testify at a grand jury investigation
concerning the matter. The lawyer claims the attorney-client
privilege bars him from testifying. The family of the deceased cli-
ent refuses to release the lawyer from the privilege. The prosecu-
tion seeks an order to compel the lawyer to testify as to what his
client has told him about the events before he committed suicide.
The prosecution intimates that such information is required by
the public interest in learning the details of a crime that has
taken the lives of a mother and child, and simultaneously, has cre-
ated intense racial division in the city. In addition, there is some
evidence that the client may have told his lawyer about other
crimes committed or to be committed by himself and others. But
the highest court of the state concludes that the lawyer cannot be
ordered to testify, and that the attorney-client privilege, even in
these circumstances, survives the death of the client. Conse-
quently, the true facts are never revealed. 17
C. Hypothetical Three
A well-respected law firm represents a savings and loan associa-
tion and its parent holding company. During the course of the
representation, the law firm learns that documents submitted to
17 See generally In re John Doe, 562 N.E.2d 69, 69 (Mass. 1990) (efforts to compel testi-
mony by lawyer of Charles Stuart of Boston regarding what he was told by his now de-
ceased client about shooting of his pregnant wife, Carol DiMaiti Stuart).
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the Federal Home Loan Bank Board on behalf of the client may
have contained deliberate omissions and falsifications. Nonethe-
less, the firm continues to represent the thrift before the Board
and to urge favorable treatment so as to reduce the risk of regula-
tory intervention. There is no disclosure to the Board or the
thousands of investors in the savings and loan and its parent com-
pany. Subsequently, it becomes clear that the client has engaged
in numerous fraudulent transactions, which artificially inflated
the net worth of the thrift and discouraged regulatory interven-
tion. The client eventually goes bankrupt, resulting in millions of
dollars in losses to investors, and enormous losses to taxpayers
when the bank has to bailed out by the federal government. The
events form the basis of a nationwide scandal involving the sav-
ings and loan industry. 18
D. Hypothetical Four
A defendant in a murder case tells his lawyer that he will take
the stand in his own defense and falsely testify. The defendant
wants to tell the jury that he saw a silver object in the victim's
hand before he shot him. The defendant says that if he does not
testify in this manner he will be convicted. The lawyer tells the
client that he cannot pejure himself, and that if he does do so, the
lawyer will withdraw and tell the court of the client's perjury. In
face of the threat, the client testifies truthfully, is convicted, and
sentenced to many years in prison. 19
E. Hypothetical Five
A lawyer represents a corporate client in the filing of stock re-
gistration statements. The lawyer withdraws from the law firm
when a decision is made by the partners not to disclose certain
information on a current filing statement. The lawyer then drafts
and files a statement concerning this matter with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Eventually, the law firm, as well as
the lawyer, are named as defendants in a lawsuit by disgruntled
18 See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990); In re American
Continental CorpJLincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1989); see
also John H. Cushman, Credit Markets; Paul Weiss Law Firm to Pay U.S. $45 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at D10; James S. Granelli, Law Firm to Pay $51 Million in Keating
Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at D1.
19 See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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stockholders of the client. The lawyer turns over information to
the plaintiffs' counsel regarding the lawyer's lack of involvement
and the behavior of others in the law firm. The plaintiffs drop the
lawyer from the suit, but proceeds against the other members of
the law firm.20
II. QUESTIONING THE PROPRIETY OF RULES REQUIRING
MAINTENANCE OF CLIENT CONFIDENCES WHEN SOCIETAL
OR INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE
The general public questions the appropriateness of rules that
require the maintenance of client confidences when there are con-
trary societal or individual interests at stake. The strict mainte-
nance of client confidences seems particularly hypocritical when
juxtaposed against rules that expressly permit revelation of confi-
dences when the interests of the courts or lawyers are at issue.
Was the conduct of the lawyers proper in each of the preceding
hypotheticals? One might ask, what does "proper" mean? For
purposes of this discussion, "proper" means conduct which is pro-
fessionally acceptable under the profession's most recent articula-
tion of "professional responsibility," the Model Rules. 21 Therefore,
the answer in each situation is an unqualified "yes." In each hypo-
thetical the lawyer or law firm acted in a way considered to be
professionally "responsible," and countenanced by the Model
Rules. Client confidences must be maintained, notwithstanding
societal or individual harm. The only exceptions are where the
confidences concern future criminal conduct likely to cause immi-
nent death or substantial bodily harm,22 the commission of fraud
on the court,23 or information which the lawyer needs to succeed
in a controversy with a client or to defend himself or herself.24
Discretion is permitted in circumstances involving potentially
harmful future criminal conduct likely to cause physical harm.25
But under the Model Rules, there is no discretion to disclose fu-
ture criminal conduct likely to result in economic harm, or physi-
cally harmful noncriminal conduct. And, of course, disclosure of
20 See Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire Marine Insur. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1192 (2d. Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
21 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFEssIoNAL CoNDucr (1984).
22 See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(1).
23 See MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3(a)(4).
24 See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(bX2).
25 See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(a).
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past criminal conduct is forbidden under any circumstances.
The Model Rules have created a virtual war between societal
and individual interests, and those of clients, lawyers, and the
courts. The Model Rules set forth a very strange hierarchy of pro-
tections in the area of client confidentiality. The oddity of this
new ordering is clear when one compares the client confidentiality
protections and discretionary lawyer disclosure afforded by the
former ABA Canons and ABA Code with the Model Rules.
A. The History of Client Confidentiality
A historical look at client confidentiality begins with an exami-
nation of the rules regarding confidentiality under prior ABA ethi-
cal codes. In addition, attention should be directed at the attor-
ney-client evidentiary privilege.26 That privilege excludes from
evidence the substance of lawyer-client communications. The evi-
dentiary privilege is intrinsically related to the ethical rules of
lawyer-client confidentiality. Indeed, under the ABA Code, as
seen below, the evidentiary privilege formed the basis for ethical
confidentiality protections.2" Yet, over the years, the evidentiary
privilege and the lawyers' ethical responsibilities, have gone
somewhat different routes in detail and coverage with respect to
client confidentiality. Thus, the inquiry here looks primarily to
protections afforded under the ethical codes.
1. The ABA Canons
The ABA Canons were adopted by the ABA in 1908.28 Prior to
the adoption of the ABA Canons, approaches to professional ethics
were developed on a state-by-state basis. In 1884, Judge George
Sharswood, a lawyer, teacher, and justice of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, put together a proposal on the norms of profes-
sional conduct, delivered through a series of lectures, entitled An
Essay on Professional Ethics.29 This proposal was widely circu-
lated, and served as a model for professional conduct throughout
the states.3 0 Alabama, following the model, was the first state to
26 See CAL. Evm. CODE § 954 (Deering 1993); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4503 (McKinney
1993).
27 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1969).
28 See CANONS OF PRoFESSIoNAL ETHics Preamble (1908).
29 GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics (5th ed. 1884).
3o Charles Frankel, Code of Professional Responsibility, 43 U. Cmi. L. REv. 874, 875
(1976) (book review).
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adopt a professional code in 1887.1 Soon, however, it was appar-
ent that the problem was a national one and thus, in 1908, the
ABA Canons were adopted as a uniform code for lawyers across
the country.32 Thirty-two canons were adopted in 1908 and thir-
teen more in 1928. 33
a. Confidentiality Protections Under the ABA Canons
The first thirty-two canons did not contain a specific canon re-
garding client confidentiality. Canon 6 generally provided that a
lawyer had an "obligation to represent the client with undivided
fidelity and not to divulge his [or her] secrets or confidences."34
Canon 37, the specific confidentiality canon, was added in 1928
and amended in 1937. 35 It read, in part:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his [or her] client's confi-
dences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and ex-
tends as well to [the lawyer's] employees; and neither of them
should accept employment which involves or may involve the
disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private
advantage of the lawyer or [the lawyer's] employees or to the
disadvantage of the client, without [the lawyer's] knowledge
and consent, and even though there are other available
sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue em-
ployment when he [or she] discovers that this obligation pre-
vents the performance of [the lawyer's] full duty to his [or her]
former or . . . new client.36
Even in the ABA Canons, however, exceptions to client confi-
dentiality existed. Provisions included the areas of lawyer self-
defense and announced intentions of clients to commit crime.
b. Exceptions to Client Confidentiality Under the ABA
Canons
Canon 37 provided two exceptions to the confidentiality require-
ment. They were in the nature of revelations necessary to defend
the lawyer and revelations necessary to prevent crimes from tak-
31 Id.
32 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics (1908) (amended 1928, 1933, 1937, 1940, 1942,
1951, 1956) [hereinafter ABA CANONS].
33 Id.
34 ABA CANONS Canon 6 (1908).
35 ABA CANONS Canon 37 (1928) (amended 1937).
36 Id.
1993]
448 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
ing place. Canon 37 read, in part:
If a lawyer is accused by his [or her] client, [the lawyer] is not
precluded from disclosing the truth in respect to the accusa-
tion. The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is
not included within the confidences which [a lawyer] is bound
to respect. [The lawyer] may properly make such disclosures
as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect those
against whom it is threatened.3 7
Thus, the lawyer had discretion to reveal confidences in defense of
a client's accusation, or to prevent future criminal acts in order to
protect potential victims.
However, there were certain circumstances under the ABA Ca-
nons where lawyers appeared to be mandated to disclose client
confidences. One such instance involved the disclosure of perjury
or fraud on the court. Canon 29 provided: "The counsel upon the
trial of a cause in which perjury has been committed owe it to the
profession and to the public to bring the matter to the knowledge
of the prosecuting authorities.""8 Moreover, Canon 41, added in
1928, also ordered a lawyer to inform against his or her client in
certain circumstances in regard to "fraud or deception."39 It read:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has
been practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or
a party, [the lawyer] should endeavor to rectify it; at first by
advising [the] client, and if [the] client refuses to forego the
advantage thus unjustly gained, [the lawyer] should promptly
inform the injured person or his [or her] counsel, so that they
may take appropriate steps.4 °
However, over the years, there were situations brought to the
attention of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics in which
the confidentiality provisions of Canon 37 conflicted with the dis-
closure of fraud provisions of Canons 29 and 41. The Committee,
in a series of opinions, addressed these conflicts by suggesting
that, in such a case, the lawyer was to urge the client to disclose
perjury, but if client failed to do so, the lawyer was only to with-
draw, not disclose. 4 '
37 ABA CANONS Canon 37 (1928).
38 ABA CANONS Canon 29 (1908).
39 ABA CANONS Canon 41 (1928).
40 Id.
41 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953) (with re-
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Indeed, in an earlier opinion, the Committee stated that a law-
yer could not reveal the false claims of residence previously made
by his client.42 The Committee held: "While ordinarily it is the
duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to disclose to the court
any fraud that he [or she] believes is being practiced on the court,
this duty does not transcend that to preserve the client confi-
dences."43 Finally, in 1965, the Committee held that a lawyer
could not reveal that his client, the wife in a divorce case, was
pregnant by another man.44
It was, however, unmistakable that under the ABA Canons that
discretion to disclose confidential client information in the situa-
tions of client accusation against a lawyer and the announced in-
tention of a client to commit a future crime was preserved. For
example, in 1936, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics
stated:
When the communication by the client to his [or her] lawyer
is in respect to the future commission of an unlawful act or to
a continuing wrong, the communication is not privileged. One
who is actually engaged in committing a wrong can have no
privileged witnesses, and public policy forbids that a lawyer
should assist in the commission thereof. . . .45
That same year in another opinion the ABA Committee stated
that in a case of continued wrongdoing on the part of a client:
"Such information, even though coming to the lawyer from the cli-
ent in the course of his [or her] professional relations with respect
to other matters in which [the lawyer] represents the defendant, is
not privileged from disclosure."46
Not only was there discretion to disclose in cases of future
crime, but the language of some of these decisions implied that, in
cases of serious crime or crime involving the judicial process, the
lawyer was under an obligation to disclose. In 1965, the ABA
Committee commented that if a lawyer knows beyond a reason-
spect to past client perjury, protections of ABA Canon 31 outweigh those of Canons 29 and
41).
42 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 268 (1945).
43Id.
44 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 869 (1965).
45 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155 (1936), with-
drawn, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-349 (1984).
46 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 156 (1936), with-
drawn, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-349 (1984).
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able doubt that his or her client is going to commit a crime, disclo-
sure should take place.4" Decisions by the ABA Committee indi-
cated an obligation to disclose in certain other circumstances as
well, for example, in the case of a client escaping from custody.4"
And regarding a client's violation of probation and "continuing"
wrongdoing, the ABA Committee held that if a client "persists in
violating the terms and conditions of... probation, it is the duty of
the lawyer as an officer of the court to advise the proper authori-
ties concerning [the] client's conduct.4 9
2. The ABA Code
In 1954, it was decided that a complete revision of the ABA Ca-
nons was necessary because the changing professional environ-
ment for lawyers in this country and the fact that ethical princi-
ples and precepts needed to be more applicable to concrete
situations, and more consistent among each other.5" Thus in 1964,
the ABA appointed a committee to do so. 51
In 1969, the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (the "ABA
Code") was promulgated. 52 The ABA Code consisted of four identi-
fiable types of provisions: canons, disciplinary rules, definitions,
and ethical considerations. As noted in the ABA Code: "Canons
[were] statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general
terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in
their relationships with the public, with the legal system, and
with the legal profession. They embod[ied] the general concepts
from which the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules are
47 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 314 (1966).
48 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155 (1936), with-
drawn, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-349 (1984).
The Committee found:
In failing to disclose his [or her] client's whereabouts as a fugitive under these circum-
stances the attorney would not only be aiding [the] client to escape trial on the charge
for which [the client] was indicted, but would likewise be aiding [the client] in evading
prosecution for the additional offense of escape. It is the opinion of the committee that
under such circumstances the attorney's knowledge of [the] client's whereabouts is not
privileged, and that [the attorney] may be disciplined for failing to disclose that infor-
mation to the proper authorities.
Id.
49 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 156 (1936), with-
drawn, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-349 (1984).
50 ANDREW KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmIIr 16-17 (3d ed. 1989);
see Frankel, supra note 30, at 875.
51 KAuFmAN, supra note 50, at 17.
52 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIT (1969) [hereinafter ABA CODE].
Although the ABA CODE has been revised several times it retains its general format.
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derived."5 3 While general in nature, breach of the canons could
constitute misconduct.
The disciplinary rules of the ABA Code were mandatory and
akin to statutory provisions in that they stated the minimum level
of conduct to which one could fall without being subject to disci-
pline.54 The definitions defined terms used in the disciplinary
rules.55 The ethical considerations of the ABA Code were "aspira-
tional in character and represent[ed] the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive. They constitute[d]
a body of principles upon which the lawyer [could] rely for gui-
dance in many specific situations."56 The ethical considerations
addressed specific factual situations and suggested appropriate
lawyer behavior in such situations, even conflicting ones. The eth-
ical considerations often gave the rationales behind particular
stances taken in the ABA Code.
a. Confidentiality Protections Under the ABA Code
Canon 4 was the confidentiality canon of the ABA Code. Canon
4 provided: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets
of a client."5 7 The disciplinary rules under Canon 4 defined "confi-
dences" and "secrets" as follows:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-
client privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to
other information gained in the professional relationship that
the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detri-
mental to the client.5 8
The disciplinary rules under Canon 4 further provided that a
lawyer could:
not knowingly: (1) Reveal a confidence or secret of [a] client;
(2) use a confidence or secret of [a] client to the disadvantage
of the client. (3) Use a confidence or secret of [a] client for the
advantage of [the lawyer] or of a third person, unless the cli-
53 See ABA CODE Preliminary Statement (1969).
64 Id.
55 See ABA CODE Definitions (1969).
56 ABA CODE Preliminary Statement (1969).
57 ABA CODE Canon 4.
58 ABA CODE DR 4-101(A).
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ent consents after full disclosure.59
As indicated, the attorney-client evidentiary privilege is incor-
porated in the ABA Code's definition of "confidence."
b. Attorney-Client Evidentiary Privilege
In 1888, the United States Supreme Court focused on the need
for the attorney-client evidentiary privilege:
The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communica-
tions between client and attorney is founded upon the neces-
sity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of
persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its prac-
tice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of
when free from the consequences or the apprehension of
disclosure6 0
The privilege, however, inasmuch as it "may serve as a mecha-
nism to frustrate the investigative or fact-finding process,"61 will
apply only if:
(1) The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become
a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made
(a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his [or her]
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the lawyer was informed (a) by his [or her] client (b)
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of secur-
ing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services
or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege
has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.62
As such, the attorney-client evidentiary privilege is to be strictly
construed.6 3 Nonetheless, it has been held that the privilege:
is the price that society must pay for the availability of justice
to every citizen, which is the value that the privilege is
designed to secure. The "social good derived from the proper
performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients
59 ABA CODE DR 4-101(B).
60 Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).61 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1246 (1984).
62 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp. 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
63 Id.
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... outweigh[s] the harm that may have come from the sup-
pression of the evidence."6 4
The privilege belongs only to the client and can only be waived
by the client.6 5 The attorney-client privilege survives the client's
death, which assures that "the mouth of the lawyer [will] be for-
ever sealed."66 However, an executor or administrator of a client's
estate may, in some instances, waive the privilege of the deceased
client. 7 This is especially true where a lawyer is called to testify
after a client's death concerning the client's testamentary
intentions.6 8
The attorney-client evidentiary privilege, of course, is much
more limited in scope than the ethical privilege. As indicated
above, under Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A), the protections afforded
client "secrets" in addition to "confidences" covered much more
than "confidential" client information protected under the eviden-
tiary privilege. In this regard, Ethical Consideration 4-4 of Canon
4 stated that "the lawyer-client [evidentiary] privilege is more lim-
ited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confi-
dences and secrets of his [or her] client. The ethical precept, un-
like the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature
or source of information, or the fact that others share the knowl-
edge.69 Indeed, it has been stated that the ethical protections
under the disciplinary rule looked "beyond technical consideration
of secrecy in the evidentiary sense and [shielded] all information
given by a client to his [or her] lawyer whether or not strictly con-
fidential in nature. The sole requirement under Canon 4 [was]
that the lawyer receive the communication in his [or her] profes-
sional capacity."70
It is interesting to note, however, that although the ethical priv-
64 Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1028 (Mass.) (quoting United States v.
United Shoe March. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 906
(1985).
65 See Hatton v. Robinson, 14 Mass. (1 Pick) 416, 422 (Mass. 1833); Foster v. Hall, 12
Mass. (1 Pick) 89, 93 (Mass. 1831).
66 In re John Doe, 562 N.E.2d 69, 70 (1990) (quoting Foster v. Hall, 14 Mass. (1 Pick.) 89,
93 (Mass. 1831)).
67 Phillips v. Chase, 87 N.E. 755, 757 (Mass. 1909), appeal dismissed, 216 U.S. 616
(1910); Brooks v. Holden, 55 N.E. 802, 803 (Mass. 1900).
68 In re John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 71 (citing Doherty v. O'Callaghan, 31 N.E. 726 (Mass.
1892)).
69 ABA CODE Canon 4; ABA CODE EC 4-4.
70 Doe v. A. Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352, 1355-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd sub nom., Hall v. A.
Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972).
1993]
454 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
ilege under the ABA Code protected more client information than
the evidentiary privilege, it also "survived" the death of the client
in the same fashion as the testimonial privilege.71 The ABA Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics held the same in 1974.72 In its opin-
ion, the Committee noted that an exception to "ethical" confidenti-
ality may exist when disclosure is made after a client's death for
the benefit of the estate, when it is clear that if the client was
alive, he or she would waive confidentiality.73
c. Exceptions to Client Confidentiality Under the ABA
Code
The ABA Code retained exceptions for disclosure of client confi-
dential information from the ABA Canons and expanded the in-
stances in which client confidences could be disclosed. A lawyer
could reveal: "[c]onfidences or secrets with the consent of the cli-
ent or clients affected, but only after full disclosure to them;"74 as
well as "[c]onfidences or secrets when permitted under Discipli-
nary Rules or required by law or court order."75 "The intention of
[a] client to commit a crime and the information necessary to pre-
vent the crime" could be revealed 76 and under "[cionfidences or
secrets necessary to establish or collect [the lawyer's] fee or to de-
fend [the lawyer or his or her] employees or associates against an
accusation of wrongful conduct" could be disclosed.77
These provisions explicitly reaffirmed disclosure mechanisms
that existed for lawyers under the ABA Canons, but also broad-
ened disclosure possibilities, particularly in the area of a lawyer's
defense of himself or herself. In particular, the ABA Code did not
limit lawyer disclosure in self-defense only to those instances
where a client had made accusations against a lawyer, as had Ca-
non 37 under the ABA Canons.78 Rather, Disciplinary Rule 4-
71 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1301 (1975). Of
course, the ethical protections of confidentiality survived not only the death of the client,
but also, ipso facto, the termination of the attorney-client relationship.
72 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1293 (1974).
"Subject only to the limitations and under the conditions imposed by the subdivisions of DR
4-101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility there is no rule or reason to say that any
such confidences and secrets should not be preserved indefinitely." Id.
73 Id.
74 ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(1) (footnote omitted).
75 ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(2) (footnote omitted).
76 ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(3) (footnote omitted).
77 ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(4) (footnote omitted).
78 See ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(4).
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101(C)(4) opened the door to disclosure by a lawyer of confidential
information in response to third party claims against a lawyer in-
asmuch as the only reference was to "accusation of wrongful
conduct."79
Moreover, under the ABA Code, the question arose whether cli-
ent confidentiality would supersede the lawyer's duty to the court
as it had occurred under the ABA Canons and their interpreta-
tion. Under the ABA Code, Canon 7, the corresponding provision
to Canons 29 and 41, a lawyer was to represent a client zealously
but only within the bounds of the law.8 0 Two disciplinary rules, in
particular, addressed the issue of a lawyer's responsibility with
regard to client perjury. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(4) provided
that, in the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not know-
ingly "use perjured testimony or false evidence."8 1 This discipli-
nary rule thus provided a prohibition as to a lawyer's active in-
volvement in the future use of client perjury. In addition,
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) referenced past instances of client
perjury. If provided that a lawyer who receives information
clearly establishing that a client "has, in the course of the repre-
sentation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or a tribunal shall
promptly call upon [the] client to rectify the same, and if [the] cli-
ent refuses or is unable to do so, [the lawyer] shall reveal the
fraud to the affected person or tribunal." 2
Thus, it appeared that the ABA Code had turned the tables and
resolved the dilemma between client confidentiality and a law-
yer's duty to the court in favor of disclosure to the court. Revela-
tion was required. However, this apparent "resolution" was not
long lived. In 1974, the ABA amended Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(B)(1) providing that disclosure of the fraud should take place
"except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication. "83
The "except" clause of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) appeared,
once again, to shift the lawyer's responsibilities back to the protec-
tion of confidential client information, even though such informa-
tion indicated past fraud on a court. In 1975, the ABA seemed to
79 Id.
80 ABA CODE Canon 7.
81 ABA CODE DR 7-102(A)(4).
82 ABA CODE DR 7-102(B)(1) (amended 1974).
83 ABA CODE DR 7-102(B)(1) (1974).
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finally put the dilemma to rest. The Committee restated "the es-
sence of Formal Opinion 287, "s4 holding that client confidentiality
prevailed over duties to disclose fraud."5 The Committee inter-
preted the phrase "privileged communication," contained in the
1974 amendment, as referring to those confidences and secrets
that were required to be preserved by Disciplinary Rule 4-101.86
Thus, "privileged information" was given a very broad reading by
the ABA Committee. While the Committee did note that there
were still remaining instances where client past fraud might be
revealed, such as where the information came to the lawyer by
third-party sources and not in the context of the client's represen-
tation, 7 it appeared that the requirement of disclosure to the
court was largely interpreted out of the disciplinary rule.
d. The Hierarchy of Confidentiality Protections Under the
ABA Code
Under the ABA Code, the hierarchy of confidentiality protec-
tions was structured in this manner. Pursuant to Disciplinary
Rule 4-101(C)(3), lawyers could utilize their discretion to protect
society and individuals from any intended future client criminal
conduct. There was no explicit mandate to disclose, however; the
ABA Code appeared to "bet on lawyers' judgment and good winl."s
Moreover, the ABA Code did retain, in footnote citations to Disci-
plinary Rules 4-101(C)(2) and (3), reference to prior ABA opinions
indicating that a lawyer should disclose the announced intention
of a client to commit a crime in certain situations.8 9
The courts were protected from client perjury in that, under
Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(4), a lawyer could not suborn future
client perjury. But clients were given somewhat enlarged protec-
tion under Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) because past client fraud
84 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953).
85 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Frankel, supra note 30, at 882.
89 See ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(2) & (3) nn.15-17 (citing ABA Comm. on Professional Eth-
ics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155, 156 (1936)); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1966). However, the Preamble to the ABA CODE states in
its first footnote reference that the ABA CODE footnotes "are intended merely to enable the
reader to relate the provisions of this code to the ABA Canons . . .adopted in 1908, as
amended, the Opinions of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, and a limited
number of other sources. . . ."See ABA CODE Preamble n.1 (1969).
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on a court could not be disclosed if the lawyer learned of the fraud
through a privileged communication. 0
Finally, lawyers themselves were given greater protections than
they previously had under the ABA Code. Disciplinary Rule 4-
101(C)(4) allowed a lawyer to reveal confidential client informa-
tion in light of accusations of wrongful conduct against the lawyer,
seemingly from any source.9"
3. The Model Rules
Soon after the ABA Code was adopted, many concluded that its
provisions were "inadequate for the needs of the profession."92
Professor Andrew Kaufman has commented on the factors that led
to this conclusion:
Shortly after [ABA Code] was promulgated, the involvement
of so many lawyers in Watergate focused the attention of the
public and profession on lawyers' conduct. In addition, a
number of substantive problems, especially conflict of interest
and confidentiality, became part of the staple of lawyers' daily
routine. Moreover, decisions of the Supreme Court held a
number of the profession's rules relating to the provision of
legal services unconstitutional. All these factors combined
with a variety of particular criticisms to lead many people to
conclude that the [ABA Code was inadequate].9 3
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") were
adopted by the ABA in 1983. 94 They were designed as "rules of
reason,"95 providing a "framework for the ethical practice of
law."96 The Model Rules appear to be very much a "client-cen-
90 See KAUTIAN, supra note 50, at 175. There are commentators who do not view this
exception as absolute. Professor Kaufman is of the view that past client perjury had to be
revealed under DR 7-102(B)(1) if the client intended to repeat the perjury or intended "to
secure a favorable judgment or settlement based on [the prior] false testimony." Id. Profes-
sor Kaufman's view is that, in such a case since the lawyer had discretion under DR 4-
101(C)(3) to disclose the announced intention of the client to commit a crime, i.e., future
perjury or to commit another crime based on the prior false testimony, the information was
not "privileged" under DR 7-102(B)(1). In other words, discretion to reveal future intended
criminal conduct under DR 4-101(CX3) removed any confidentiality protection as to the
information and, as such, the past perjury had to be revealed because DR 7-102(B)(1) pro-
tected only "privileged information." Id. at 175-177.
91 ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(4).
92 KAuFmAu, supra note 50, at 17.
93 Id.
94 MODEL RULES OF PROFESsioNAL CoNDucT Definitions (1983).
95 MODEL RULES Preliminary Statement (1983).
96 MODEL RULES Scope, para. 2 (1983).
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tered" code, the accuracy of which description is largely borne out
by the confidentiality provisions of the Model Rules discussed
below.
The organization of the Model Rules differs from that of the
ABA Code as well as the ABA Canons. The Model Rules begin
with a Preamble, which sets forth the various roles that a lawyer
may perform: adviser, advocate, negotiator, intermediary, evalu-
ator, and citizen.97 The Preamble also comments that the Model
Rules attempt to prescribe terms for resolving conflicts among a
lawyer's various responsibilities. 98 The Preamble also strongly ar-
gues for the maintenance of an independent and self-governing
legal profession.99
The Scope section follows the Preamble. The Scope section
notes that some of the Model Rules are cast in obligatory terms
while others are discretionary. 00 While the Model Rules provide a
framework for the ethical practice of law, they "do not exhaust,
however, the moral and ethical considerations that should inform
a lawyer." 10 In addition, they are to be considered within the
larger context of substantive law, which also has a bearing on ap-
propriate lawyer conduct.' 0 2 The Scope section also provides that
breach of the Model Rules is a basis for invoking the disciplinary
process, although not necessarily a means for imposing civil liabil-
ity or as a procedural tool.' 0 3 The Scope section ends by noting
that each of the Model Rules is followed by a comment that "ex-
plains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule." 04
The comments, which can be lengthy, "are intended as guides to
interpretation, but the text of each rule is authoritative." 05
Following the Scope section, the Terminology section defines a
number of terms that are used in the Model Rules and com-
ments. 10 6 Thereafter, fifty-two Model Rules are set out, each of
which is followed by a comment. 0 7 Finally, notes comparing spe-
97 MODEL RULES Preamble (1983).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 MODEL RuLEs Scope, para. 1 (1983).
101 Id. para. 2.
102 Id. para. 3.
103 Id. para. 5 & 6.
104 Id. para. 9.
105 Id.
106 MODEL RuLEs Terminology (1983).
107 See generally MODEL RuLEs.
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cific Model Rules to the ABA Code provisions are provided. Such
"'notes' have not been adopted, do not constitute part of the Model
Rules, and are not intended to affect the application or interpreta-
tion of the rules and comments." 108 Among its many provisions,
the Model Rules contain prohibitions as well as allowances in the
areas of client confidentiality and disclosure.
a. Confidentiality Protections Under the Model Rules
The Model Rules follow through on the approach of the ABA Ca-
nons and ABA Code by providing for the protection from disclo-
sure of client confidential information. Model Rule 1.6 provides
that a "lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the repre-
sentation of a client."'0 9 Thus, Model Rule 1.6 "eliminates the two-
pronged duty under the [Model] Code [to protect confidences and
secrets] in favor of a single standard protecting all information
about a client relating to representation."" l0 Model Rule 1.6 "im-
poses confidentiality on information relating to the representation
even if it is acquired before or after the relationship existed. It
does not require the client to indicate information that is to be
confidential, or permit the lawyer to speculate whether particular
information might be embarrassing or detrimental.""'
From one perspective, Model Rule 1.6 enlarged the protections
of client confidentiality previously existing under the ABA Code
because it applies to all information about a client "relating to the
representation."" 2 That definition avoids the constricted defini-
tion of confidence" 3 appearing in the ABA Code, as well as ex-
tends protection to information relating to the representation
whether or not such information would be embarrassing or
detrimental. 14
On the other hand, inasmuch as Model Rule 1.6 and its com-
mentary specify that, to be protected, the client information must
"relate to the representation," 1 5 arguably the ABA Code, in pro-
108 MODEL RULES Scope, para. 9.
109 MODEL RULES Rule 1.6.
110 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
88 (1992) [hereinafter ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES].
111 Id. at 89.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES; see MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt., paras. 4, 5. Note
that the MODEL RULES do not number the paragraphs of the comments. Yet, for ease of
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tecting from disclosure client "secrets" as well as "confidences"
may, in certain instances, have afforded greater protection for em-
barrassing or detrimental client information that was not related
to the representation of the client. There are numerous excep-
tions to client confidentiality under the Model Rules, as there
were under its predecessor codes. These exceptions, of course, are
the main focus of this article.
b. Exceptions to Client Confidentiality Under the Model
Rules
The Model Rules provide several exceptions to client confidenti-
ality. Model Rule 1.6 provides the initial exceptions to the protec-
tion from disclosure of information relating to the representation
of a client. Under Model Rule 1.6(a), a lawyer may disclose client
confidential information if the client consents. 1 16 Moreover, disclo-
sures that are impliedly authorized to carry out the representa-
tion also are allowed to be disclosed under Model Rule 1.6(a). 1 17
Under Model Rule 1.6(b), an exception to confidentiality regard-
ing client announcement of certain types of future criminal con-
duct is set forth."' Specifically, a lawyer may, under Model Rule
1.6(b)(1), reveal information relating to the representation of a cli-
ent "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary... to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm. " ' 19
Under Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), a lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation of a client in self-interest or self-
defense. That is, under Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), a lawyer may reveal
protected client information:
[T]o the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary...
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal change [sic] or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved,
or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
reference, they are numbered here according to paragraph order.
116 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(a).
117 Id.
118 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b).
119 MODEL RULEs Rule 1.6(b)(1).
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lawyer's representation of the client. 120
Model Rule 3.3 and its commentary also set forth a quite sub-
stantial exception to maintaining client confidences in the context
of the judicial process. Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) states that a "lawyer
shall not knowingly... offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false. If a lawyer has offered material false evidence and comes to
know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial
measures."' 21 The "reasonable remedial measures" referenced in
Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) are found in the Model Rule's commentary:
If perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered, the
advocate's proper course ordinarily is to remonstrate with the
client confidentially. If that fails, the advocate should seek to
withdraw if that will remedy the situation. If withdrawal will
not remedy the situation or is impossible, the advocate should
make disclosure to the court. 122
Thus, Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) and its commentary provide an explicit
exception to the confidentiality protections of Model Rule 1.6 in
the case of past client perjury.
c. Disclosures Consented to or Impliedly Authorized By the
Client to Carry Out Representation
Under Model Rule 1.6(a), protected client information can be
disclosed if the client consents. 123 This also was clearly the case
under the corresponding ABA Code provision, Disciplinary Rule 4-
101(C)(1).124 Under the ABA Code, consent had to "be proceeded
by communication with the client, fully disclosing the import of
such revelation." 2 5 Thus, the consent for disclosure obtained,
while not specifically stated in the ABA Code, would have been
"knowing." Consent to the lawyer for disclosure should, as well,
be clearly given by the client and received by the lawyer; the best
practice is to obtain written client consent to disclosure of pro-
tected information. 126
Yet "implied" consent, even though not specifically addressed in
120 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(2).
121 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3(a)(4).
122 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3 cmt., para. 11.
123 MODEL RULEs Rule 1.6(a).
124 ABA CODE DR 4-101(CX1) (1970).
125 GiLDA M.Tuoml, MAssAcHuSs'rrs AToRNEY CoNDUCT MAuuAL, 4-45 (1992).
126 Id.
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the ABA Code, had been countenanced in matters arising under
the ABA Code where it was necessary to the effective conduct of
the representation.127 This notion, however, was expressly
adopted in Model Rule 1.6(a). That is, the Model Rule "recognizes
that a client impliedly consents to disclosures necessary to effect
the purposes of the representation."' As such, the Model Rules
did not greatly alter the prior approach regarding client author-
ized disclosure under the ABA Code, although the Model Rules
made specific allowance of "implied" client consent to certain nec-
essary lawyer disclosures.
d. Disclosure of Announced Future Criminal Conduct
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) permits disclosure of a client's prospective
crime only when the lawyer reasonably believes such disclosure is
necessary "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm ... .129 This rule departs substantially
from the prior ABA Code provision, Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3).
"While Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3) [gave] lawyers discretion to
report the announced intention of a client to commit any crime,
Model Rule 1.6 (b)(1) gives discretion to reveal only certain types
of proposed crime,"130 those potentially resulting in serious physi-
cal harm to a victim.
Both the ABA Code provision, Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3),
and Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) are in sync in not mandating disclosure
of future criminal conduct in any instance. "However, unlike Dis-
ciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3), [under the Model Rules] '[c]rimes the
likely consequence of which are not substantial are not subject to
disclosure.' Applying the Model Rules, crimes which are not sub-
stantial are those which do not involve the potential of imminent
death or substantial bodily harm."13'
Consequently, under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), lawyers cannot dis-
close the announced intention of a client to commit a crime likely
to result in financial injury.132 It has been stated that such provi-
127 See id.; see also Smith v. Bentley, 9 F.R.D. 489, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1476 (1981).
128 ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RuLEs 67 (1992).
129 MODEL RULEs Rule 1.6(b)(1).
130 See TuONl, supra note 125, at 4-57 (emphasis in original).
131 Id. (quoting ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RuLEs 71 (1992) (footnote omitted)).
132 See MODEL RULEs Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (providing an exception
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sion is "based upon the interest in harm prevention, not the pre-
vention of misconduct as such."'33 Whatever the rationale, this as-
pect of the Model Rules has resulted in an enormous limitation of
lawyer discretion to disclose client confidences when the interests
of others are at stake. As discussed below, such restriction has,
perhaps, resulted in an irresolvable conflict between the Model
Rules' confidentiality obligations of lawyers toward clients and the
interests of society and individuals in being protected from, among
other things, financial injury.
In addition, the Model Rules, like the ABA Code, do not allow
lawyer discretion to disclose client announced future conduct
which is likely to physically endanger another if such conduct is
not technically "criminal" in nature. Thus, if a client's intended
action will "indirectly" harm another, "direct" conduct causing
harm usually being criminal in nature, no lawyer discretion to dis-
close exists.' 34
e. Disclosures By a Lawyer Due to Self-interest or in Self-
Defense
Under Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), the instances in which a lawyer
may disclose otherwise protected client information in so-called
self-interest or self-defense have been enlarged. The ABA Code,
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(4), recognized exceptions to client con-
fidentiality in order for a lawyer to establish or collect a fee or to
defend against an accusation of wrongful conduct.135 As to the use
of client confidences in fee disputes, "fairness considerations his-
torically have been raised to support lawyers' revelation of client
confidential information in order to protect their economic inter-
ests."'3 6 In this regard, the ABA Committee on Professional Eth-
ics commented as early as 1943:
[T]he adjudicated cases recognize an exception to the rule
[that a lawyer should not reveal the confidences of his or her
client], where the disclosure is necessary to protect the law-
yer's interests arising out of the relation of lawyer and client
to client confidentiality which would have allowed lawyers to reveal client intended finan-
cial crime). But see TuoNI, supra note 125, at 4-57.
133 ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RuLEs 71 (1992).
134 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(2) cmt.
135 ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(4).
136 See TUONI, supra note 125, at 4-64 (citing CHARLEs W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETmcs 308 (1986)).
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in which disclosure was made. 137
Nonetheless, support for the former ABA provision has not been
universal, and has even been referred to as "scandalously self-
serving."138 And, of course, there were limitations to the extent of
disclosure allowed under the ABA Code provisions. As indicated
in Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(4), permitted disclosure was limited
to the extent "necessary" to collect or establish the fee.139 The ABA
Committee on Professional Ethics emphasized such limitations
early on,'4 0 and several bar associations echoed the same.' 4 '
The Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) provision, allowing a lawyer to reveal
protected client information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary "to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client," im-
plicitly allows revelation of client information in a fee dispute with
a client. But, of course, the matter in dispute need not, under the
Model Rules, be limited solely to a fee question. Rather, "Model
Rule 1.6(b)(2) enlarges the exception to include disclosure of infor-
mation relating to claims by the lawyer other than for a fee-for
example, recovery of property from the client. 42
Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) does retain, in its commentary, the restric-
tion on the amount of self-interest or self-defense disclosure that
can be made, however. The commentary provides that a "lawyer
must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclo-
sure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure
to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective or-
ders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of
disclosure. " 143
The major change from the ABA Code in lawyer disclosures in
137 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 250 (1943).
138 ALAN H. GoLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics 101 (1988).
139 ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(4).
140 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 250 (1943).
141 See NYC Ethics Op. 1986-88 (1986); Ala. Ethics Op. 86-2 (1982); Ga. Ethics Op. 49
(1985); Phila. Ethics Op. 86-158 (1986). Under the Model Code, however, it was clear that a
lawyer was to make reasonable efforts to collect a fee without resorting to litigation. ABA
CODE Canon 2 and ABA CODE EC 2-23 provided that a "lawyer should be zealous in ...
efforts to avoid controversies over fees with clients and should attempt to resolve amicably
any differences on the subject. [The lawyer] should not sue a client for a fee unless neces-
sary to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client." Id. As such, attorney disclosure of
client confidences in order to collect a fee should have taken place under the Model Code
only as a last and rather limited resort.
142 ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RuLEs 71.
143 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(2) cmt. 18 (1983).
[Vol. 8:439
NEW CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
self-interest or self-defense, however, comes in that portion of
Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) regarding responding to accusations of
wrongful conduct. Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) allows a lawyer to reveal
confidential client information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
[T]o establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the law-
yer's representation of the client.'44
Under the ABA Code, Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(4) allowed a
lawyer to reveal confidences or secrets necessary to defend the
lawyer or his or her "associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct." 145 In 1943, under the ABA Canons, the ABA Committee
on Professional Ethics commented on such "defensive" disclosures:
But the lawyer may disclose information received from the cli-
ent when it becomes necessary for [the lawyer's own protec-
tion], as if the client should bring an action against the lawyer
for negligence or misconduct, and it became necessary for the
lawyer to show what his [or her] instructions were, or what
was the nature of the duty which the client expected [the law-
yer] to perform. So if it became necessary for the lawyer to
bring an action against the client, the client's privilege could
not prevent the lawyer from disclosing what was essential as
a means of obtaining or defending his [or her] own rights.146
What was limited under the ABA Code Disciplinary Rule, how-
ever, were the circumstances allowing a lawyer to disclose infor-
mation in self-defense. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(4) addressed
"accusations of wrongful conduct,"147 and the above-noted ABA
Committee Opinion referenced a client bringing an "action." 148 Ju-
dicial decisions, under the ABA Code, countenanced revelation
when "a client call[ed] into public question the competence of his
[or her] lawyer." 149 The ABA Code footnote, which referenced to
144 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(2).
145 ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(4) (1980).
146 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 250 (1943).
147 ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(4).
148 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 250 (1943).
149 See Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125
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illustrative situations involving lawyer disclosure, also cited in-
stances of "actions" or litigation between lawyer and client. 150
Under the Model Rules, however, several situations are refer-
enced in which a lawyer may disclose client confidences in self-
interest or self-defense. Such disclosure under Model Rule
1.6(b)(2) can take place either by means of a claim or a defense in
a controversy between a lawyer and a client.' Further, disclo-
sure can be made to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer which charge or claim is based upon
conduct in which the client was involved.' 52 Finally, disclosure of
client information can be made in response to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.15 3
What these three provisions of Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) have done is
to allow disclosure in contexts other than a dispute between law-
yer and client. For example, the disclosure of client information
can be made when third parties bring a claim against a lawyer
based upon conduct in which the lawyer is involved. Further, the
Model Rule does not require "a proceeding" already to have com-
menced before the lawyer's ability to disclose arises. The com-
mentary to Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) provides:
The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of...
complicity has been made. Paragraph (b)(2) does not require
the lawyer to await commencement of an action or proceeding
that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be es-
tablished by responding directly to a third party who has
made such assertion.15 4
Thus, the Model Rules have liberalized the prior approach of both
the ABA Canons and the ABA Code in the context of lawyer disclo-
sures in self-interest or self-defense. 155
f. Disclosure of Client Perjury
Under Model Rule 3.3, a quite substantial exception to main-
taining client confidences arises in the context of the judicial pro-
(1974); Commonwealth v. Woodbury, 530 N.E.2d 1260, 1261-63 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).
150 See ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(4) n.19.
151 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(2).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(2) cmt. 17.
155 See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RuLEs 71-72. Of course Model Rules Rule 1.6(b)(2) still
requires that a lawyer's belief be "reasonable" regarding the extent of disclosure necessary.
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cess when a client has committed perjury. Model Rule 3.3(a)(4)
prohibits a lawyer from knowingly offering evidence that is false
and, if the lawyer comes to know of the falsity of material evidence
he or she has offered, the lawyer must remedy the situation.156
The "reasonable remedial measures" are contained in the com-
mentary to Model Rule 3.3. They are to remonstrate with the cli-
ent and, if that fails to withdraw.'5 7 If withdrawal does not rem-
edy the perjury or withdrawal is not possible, the lawyer must
disclose the information to the court. 1
58
Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) radically changed past practice under both
the ABA Canons and the ABA Code. As indicated, under the ABA
Canons and the ABA Code, client confidentiality prevailed over
duties of the lawyer to disclose fraud to the court. However, under
the Model Rules, a lawyer is now obligated to disclose client per-
jury to the court if nothing else works in remedying the fraudulent
testimony or evidence. 159 The rightness or wrongness of this ap-
proach is not the main subject of this analysis although it has
been discussed at length elsewhere and will be referenced be-
low.160 What is the main focus here, however, is the irony of the
Model Rules dramatically changing a lawyer's responsibilities by
requiring disclosure of client confidences in order to protect the
judicial process, while simultaneously restricting greatly the law-
yer's discretion to disclose client information in order to protect
societal and individual interests.
4. Hierarchy of Protections Under the Model Rules
a. Client Confidentiality Under the Model Rules versus
Societal and Individual Interests
The Model Rules have contributed substantially to the juxtapo-
sition of standards for lawyers regarding protection of client confi-
dential information and the interests of society and of individual
156 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3(aX4).
157 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3 cmt. 11.
158 Id.
159 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 353 (1987).
But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249 (1991)
(footnote omitted) (noting that at least one distinguished commentator in this area has
stated that "what might be 'reasonable remedial measures' [is] still under debate.").
160 See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHics 129-32 (1990) [herein-
after FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETIucs]; Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client
Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1939, 1954-55 (1988).
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persons other than clients. On the one hand, as seen above, the
Model Rules have enhanced the protections given clients in the
area of announced future criminal conduct. While doing so, pro-
tections afforded to society and individuals have been lessened
with respect to clients who proclaim future criminal conduct. Fu-
ture financial criminal conduct announced to one's lawyer or law-
yers may not be divulged under any circumstances under the
Model Rules. This is so notwithstanding the potentially substan-
tial financial injury that may be caused to society as a whole or to
individuals from the criminal conduct of one or several clients.
The Model Rules have eliminated from a lawyer's discretion the
ability to protect anyone from financial harm to be caused by one's
client even when the tools for such protection are held by the law-
yer and perhaps held only by the lawyer. All a lawyer may do in
such situation is withdraw from the representation. Albeit under
the commentary to Model Rule 1.6(b), a lawyer may disaffirm or
withdraw an opinion, document, affirmation or the like previously
made on behalf of a client when the lawyer also withdraws from
representation. 16 1 While such disaffirmance may waive a "red
flag" alerting others that all is not right with the client,162 such
notice hardly is explicit and is not likely to reach intended victims
of the client's criminal design.
Simply put, Model Rule 1.6 has abandoned societal and individ-
ual interests in the context of announced future client criminal
conduct which is not of a gravely physical nature.163 Absent a
threat by a client to kill or severely physically harm another, a
lawyer under the guidance of Model Rule 1.6 can do nothing but
turn his or her "moral" back and withdraw from the representa-
tion while a client engages in criminal conduct potentially ruinous
of others. As seen below in the discussion of the hypotheticals,
this approach is detrimental not only to society and its individual
members, but also to the integrity of the legal profession and the
161 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6 cmt. 15 (1983).
162 See LAWYER'S ETIcs, supra note 160, at 100. See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, The
Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whis-
tle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REV. 455 passim (1984).
163 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(bXl) (leaving it to lawyer's discretion to reveal client's an-
nounced intention to seriously, perhaps mortally, harm another); see also LAwYER's ETHics,
supra note 160, at 104. But see Model Rules Rule 1.7(b) (Discussion Draft 1980) (mandatory
disclosure to save a life was recommended); FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS, supra note 160,
at 103 n.87 (failure to mandate disclosure in such circumstances has long been argued to be
plainly wrong and "unethical" in itself).
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sustenance of its self regulation.
Moreover, the lack of ability to disclose client announced future
conduct likely to result in grave physical harm, perhaps death to
another, but which is not technically "criminal" in nature, is
equally hard to justify. There does not appear to be any reason-
able rationale which supports such an omission when there is at
least discretion to disclose conduct, identical in future impact,
which happens to fall under the definition of crime.
b. Client Confidentiality and Accommodating Lawyers'
Own Interests
Perhaps the coup de grace of the Model Rules' "slap in the face"
to the needs of those outside of the legal system is the enhance-
ment of lawyers' ability to protect themselves through the use of
confidential client information. Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) strikes an in-
teresting accommodation of lawyers' own interests in the wake of
client confidences. Notwithstanding a client's communication to a
lawyer of confidential information, Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) provides
that such a communication can be revealed in several circum-
stances, including where the lawyer has a need to collect a fee or
defend himself or herself against accusations of wrongful conduct.
It is interesting to reflect on the fact that under the Model
Rules, a lawyer's needs to divulge confidences for his or her own
financial gain take precedence over a lawyer's responsibilities to
save unsuspecting others from financial loss. In the wake of the
substantial lessening of lawyer discretion in Model Rule 1.6(b)(1)
to protect the public from the harmful acts of clients through dis-
closure of client information, the Model Rules nonetheless opt for
greater disclosure opportunity when a lawyer needs to protect his
or her own financial or representational interests. It is difficult to
understand how a lawyer's self reputational interests are re-
garded as more worthy of protection than societal and individual
interests in not being victimized by financial crime.
c. Client Confidentiality Under the Model Rules and
Lawyers' Special Duty to the Courts
While departing radically from protections afforded society and
individuals under prior lawyer codes of conduct, the Model Rules
simultaneously greatly increase a lawyer's obligation to the
courts. As referenced above, Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) and its commen-
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tary put an affirmative obligation on a lawyer to, if all other ef-
forts fail, disclose a client's past fraudulent activity on a court
through which the lawyer's services were used. Such a rule obvi-
ously enhances the judicial process and societal confidence in it as
a truth-seeking mechanism. But, the Model Rule does so in the
context of a document, the entirety of the Model Rules, which les-
sens the protections afforded others.
The great difficulty of accepting Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) seemingly
is in this odd juxtaposition. It is, of course, hard to argue that
lawyers should suborn liars under oath! But, equally hard to ad-
vocate is that, under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), lawyers should protect
clients at the expense of extreme detriment to individuals because
such potential future crime will not be imminently "physically" in-
jurious to another.
And, as noted above, there is no mandate under the Model Rules
to disclose potentially grievous bodily harm or death which a cli-
ent announces he or she will cause another. As such, it appears at
least odd if not appalling that such mandate occurs only in the
instance of "saving" the judicial process from false evidence. The
proclamation "God save this Honorable Court" takes on a rather
different and bizarre meaning when juxtaposed against an accom-
panying sentiment of "and the public be damned."
This peculiar approach to lawyers' "ethics" is perhaps seen more
explicitly in the study below of the operation of the Model Rules in
the context of the hypotheticals. The "appropriate ethical" out-
come of each hypothetical is viewed under the applicable Model
Rule.
III. THE MODEL RULES AND THE HYPOTHETICALS
Discussed in this section are the resolution of the five hypotheti-
cals set forth at the beginning of this article. The outcome under
each hypothetical is studied in the context of the confidentiality
and disclosure provisions of the Model Rules. Throughout, cri-
tique is rendered with regard to the protection, or most often, lack
thereof, of societal and individual interests as compared to protec-
tions for lawyers and the courts.
A. Hypothetical One
The first hypothetical concerned the apparently wrongfully con-
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victed defendant who ended up spending sixteen years in prison.
The lawyer for the guilty codefendant knew, through a client con-
fidence, that the wrongfully convicted defendant was innocent.
Yet, he did not say anything, even after his own client died in
prison. Moreover, the judicial system did not allow the lawyer to
say anything about what his client had told him, the court having
denied motions to such effect, only until such time as the relatives
of the deceased client were found to release the lawyer from the
lawyer-client confidentiality protections.
Under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) this outcome clearly was required.
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) only allows a lawyer to reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from commit-
ting a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm.16 4 Under the Model
Rules, there is no discretion on the lawyer's part to disclose the
information to the court of the wrongful conviction. The client's
"criminal act" was past. He did not reveal an intention of doing
something to cause any future harmful "criminal" conduct to an-
other. All the client was going to do was to keep quiet. Obviously,
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
the client from incriminating himself.16 5 Likewise, the client had
no responsibility to exonerate another, if in order to do so, he
would have had to incriminate himself.
The situation posed in this hypothetical actually happened,
with some variation, in Massachusetts a few years ago. The de-
fendant, George Reissfelder, spent a decade and a half incarcer-
ated for a crime he did not commit.166 The lawyer for the codefend-
ant was released from his privilege only after persistent court-
appointed lawyers contacted relatives of the deceased client. The
relatives agreed to release the lawyer from the privilege, and he
was at last free to tell the court what his client had told him. This
information, along with other testimony, resulted in the defend-
ant's release from prison. 1 6
7
Interestingly, the actual case was resolved in a jurisdiction that
164 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(1).
165 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
166 See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 239 N.E.2d 5, 7 (Mass. 1968); see also supra note 16
and accompanying text.
167 Id.
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followed the ABA Code and not the Model Rules. l 68 The drafters of
the Model Rules maintained stringent client confidentiality, ignor-
ing the potential for inflicting great harm to another, while simul-
taneously loosening the protections of confidentiality in lawyer
and court-related contexts. For years, some commentators have
argued, both under the ABA Code and the Model Rules, for an
exception to confidentiality when the potential of death or serious
bodily harm to another is at issue.'6 9 Clearly the incarceration of a
wrongfully convicted defendant puts the defendant at risk of seri-
ous bodily harm. Some commentators have noted:
The most compelling reason for a lawyer to divulge a client's
confidence is to save a human life. These are two reasons to
require divulgence in such a case. First, the value at stake,
human life, is of unique importance. Second, the occasions on
which a lawyer's divulgence of a client's confidence is the only
thing that stands between human life and death and so rare
that a requirement of divulgence would pose no threat to the
systemic value of lawyer-client trust.170
Nonetheless, the Model Rules did not adopt such a life or seri-
ous harm-saving exception to rules of client confidentiality. While
the drafters originally proposed an exception mandating disclo-
sure in such a circumstance, 171 the final version of Model Rule
1.6(b)(1) was discretionary. Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) requires immi-
nent "criminal" conduct to trigger lawyer discretionary disclosure.
As noted, the codefendant's statement to his lawyer regarding the
other defendant was not such an announcement of an intention to
commit a crime. Even where the codefendant admitted his own
complicity in the crime to his lawyer, the crime had been commit-
ted and client confidentiality prevailed.
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) requires that the client's announced crimi-
nal act be likely to result in imminent death or bodily harm. 172 In
the hypothetical, such requirement of immediacy would have been
a further obstacle toward disclosure. Particularly, where as here,
the client's revelation to the lawyer took place before trial, there
168 See 359 Mass. 787, 796 (1972); In re Adoption of Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
Petition of the Boston Bar Assoc. S-4537 (Mass. 1988) (Massachusetts rejecting adoption of
Model Rules).
169 See FREEDMAN, LAWYER's ETHics supra note 160, at 103 n.87.
170 Id.
171 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.7(b) (Discussion Draft 1980).
172 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(1).
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was only the obvious immediate threat of injustice and not of great
bodily harm, assuming the innocent codefendant's pre-trial and
trial safety were assured.
Clearly, Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), as applied in the hypothetical,
would result in the maintenance of confidentiality even in light of
wrongful incarceration and the great physical, mental, emotional,
and spiritual harm, such incarceration would cause to an innocent
human being.173 Further, the result significantly undermines the
legal system's proclamation as a truth-seeking process in the pur-
suit of justice. In the context of the hypothetical, Model Rule
1.6(b)(1) may not do substantially worse than its predecessor in
this area, Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3) of the ABA Code. Yet,
this inquiry does not look at Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) alone. Rather, it
studies the Model Rule's restrictive effects in light of the various
other exceptions that the Model Rules made to client confidential-
ity in defense of lawyers and the courts. It is this author's position
that the "ethics" behind such approach in the Model Rules needs
to be seriously reexamined and remedied.
B. Hypothetical Two
In this hypothetical, the client who apparently murdered his
wife and unborn child subsequently committed suicide. He never
revealed the information concerning the events, which not only re-
sulted in the deaths of his wife and child, but also tore a city apart
because of its racial overtones. The result was appropriate under
the Model Rules. Model Rule 1.6 prohibits a lawyer from re-
vealing information relating to the representation of a client.17 4
The information the client told the lawyer in this case appears to
have been in relationship to the representation. The client sought
the lawyer out after the client's brother apparently told the police
that the client's original version of the story was a lie. Thereafter
the client went to the lawyer and presumably discussed the mat-
ter with him. A short time later the client killed himself. There
was no opportunity, under Model Rule 1.6(a), for client consent to
allow disclosure. Nor, under the same provision, was there im-
plied client authorization of disclosure to carry out the representa-
tion. The representation effectively ended on the client's suicide.
173 See supra note 16 (discussing wrongful incarceration of George Reissfelder).
174 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6.
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And under Model Rule 1.6(b), the client's statements were not in
the nature of announcements as to future crime, except, perhaps,
the future "crime" of suicide. Rather the client gave the lawyer
information regarding his participation in past events, which of
course, is protected under the Model Rules.
Under the ABA Code, the result most likely would have been
similar as the information related to a past crime. However, the
analysis of the court that decided the actual Massachusetts case,
In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation,'175 did not focus on
either the ABA Code or Model Rules. Rather, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court considered whether the attorney-client
evidentiary privilege should have been overridden given the cli-
ent's death and the compelling societal interests in obtaining the
truth of what occurred.
Yet, the court's inquiry has an indirect effect on the applicabil-
ity of the notion of "confidences" protected under Disciplinary Rule
4-101(A) of the ABA Code. As discussed earlier, Disciplinary Rule
4-101(A)'s definition of client "confidences" referenced information
protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The eviden-
tiary privilege is not so extensive as the ethical obligation. 176
Thus, the court's reasoning that the evidentiary privilege, which
was more limited than that of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to
maintain confidences, 1 7 could not be waived in the circumstances
at issue and would apply even more strenuously to the ethical
protections.
The difficulty in learning the information Charles Stuart, the
client, had discussed with his lawyer was due to the legal proposi-
tion that the evidentiary privilege survives even the death of a
client.'17  The Massachusetts court decided that "the attorney-cli-
ent privilege should not be overridden either before or after a cli-
ent's death on account of countervailing societal interests in ob-
taining evidence." 79 The court stated:
[E]xtraordinarily high value must be placed on the right of
175 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990).
176 See ABA CODE DR 4-10(A); see also supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing evolution of attorney-client privilege).
177 ABA CODE Canon 4; ABA CODE EC 4-4.
178 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts' attorney-
client privilege).
179 See TuoN, supra note 125, at 4-6 (citing In re John Doe, 562 N.E.2d 69, 71 (Mass.
1990)).
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every citizen to obtain the thoughtful advice of a fully in-
formed lawyer concerning legal matters. A rule that would
permit or require a lawyer to disclose information given to
him or her by a client in confidence, even though such disclo-
sure might be limited to the period after the client's death,
would in many instances ... so deter the client from "telling
all" as to seriously impair the lawyer's ability to function
effectively. 180
Thus, the Massachusetts court rejected the notion that a "balanc-
ing test" ought to be employed in instances where societal inter-
ests in obtaining the protected client information is great while
interests in non-disclosure are small.181 While at least two other
jurisdictions have followed such a balancing approach, 8 2 the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declined to do so based on the
"high value" of the attorney-client privilege.
A very strong and well-reasoned dissent suggested that a bal-
ancing test should be used, which focused both on the client's and
societal interests. 183 In particular, the dissent suggested that
there should be "a limited exception to the privilege in those cases
where the interests of the client are so insignificant and the inter-
ests of justice in obtaining the information so compelling, that the
administration of justice is better served through [disclosure]."8 4
The dissent also argued that applying the balancing test would
have led to the logical conclusion that societal interests in ob-
taining the information outweighed the potential harm to the cli-
ent by such revelation was small as the client was dead, his estate
had little assets, and "given the present reputation of [the client],
it is difficult to conceive of any revelation which could further de-
face his memory." 18 5
Thus, in this hypothetical, as well as in the actual case, the ap-
plication of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, the ABA
180 562 N.E.2d 69, 71 (Mass. 1990).
181 Id. "A rule that would permit or require an attorney to disclose information given in
confidence would probably defer a client from disclosing information which would seriously
impair the attorney's ability to function effectively." Id.
182 See Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 692 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976); League v.
Vanice, 374 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Neb. 1985).
183 562 N.E.2d at 73 (Nolan, J., dissenting). "The test set out in Cohen involved consider-
ation of: (1) the impact the disclosure would have on the client's daily affairs; (2) whether
the disclosure would likely lead to liability for the client or his estate; and (3) whether
disclosure would 'blacken the memory' of the deceased client." Id.
184 Id. at 72.
185 Id. at 73.
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Code, and the Model Rules all would have led to the same resolu-
tion-no disclosure absent release of the lawyer by the client's es-
tate, which release was not forthcoming. Such result leaves at
least this author, and clearly the dissent in the Massachusetts
case, once again pondering the abandonment of societal, individ-
ual, and indeed administration of justice interests in the name of
protecting client confidences. Particularly where the Model Rules
have liberalized disclosure to protect lawyers and the courts, the
lack of similar efforts to balance the needs of society and con-
cerned citizens against minor client needs, is, in a word,
inexplicable. 186
C. Hypothetical Three
Here a law firm had information indicating its client may have
falsified certain documents in the course of proceedings before the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the "Board"). The law firm did
not alert Board officials of its "suspicions," but rather chose to ad-
vocate the clients' position before the Board.
Assuming that the law firm did not "know" of the falsity of the
clients' documents, notwithstanding the firm's suspicions, under
the Model Rules the firm is permitted to advocate the clients' posi-
tions before third parties. Moreover, even if the representations
were made before a court, the law firm's conduct under the Model
Rules would be appropriate, assuming that the law firm did not
"know" of the falsity of the documents. Indeed, assuming the
firm's services were not used to offer such false evidence before a
court, the Model Rules would not allow disclosure. Finally, if the
firm learns that the clients are continuing to engage in fraudulent
transactions, no disclosure is allowed under the Model Rules. The
most that the firm could do is withdraw from the representation
and disaffirm prior opinions.
It is not suggested that these events actually occurred in the
recent savings and loan scandal involving Charles Keating, Lin-
coln Savings and Loan Association, and the American Continental
Corporation. 18 7 However, government allegations were to such ef-
fect, with at least one Federal District Court judge finding that
186 Id. "There is no 'safety valve,' no mechanism by which the attorney-client privilege
may ever be overridden by the court in the interest of justice." Id.
187 See supra note 18 (discussing savings and loan scandal).
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Lincoln Savings and Loan Association used its legal counsel to ef-
fectuate its fraudulent plans and to hinder regulatory action.,,
There also were allegations that legal counsel may have affirma-
tively tried to deceive regulators as to the Lincoln Savings and
Loan Association's falsifications. 8 9 These allegations were not ad-
judicated because many of the law firms and accounting firms in-
volved settled out-of-court.190 The settlement, by at least one of
the law firms involved, was in the neighborhood of forty-one mil-
lion dollars.'19
Assuming for our analysis of hypothetical three, the law firm
did nothing wrong, at least not under the Model Rules. Model
Rule 4.1 provides that, in the course of representing a client, "a
lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when dis-
closure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraud-
ulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by
rule 1.6.192
If the law firm had only suspicions of the falsity of client docu-
ments, but did not know them to be false, under Model Rule 4.1(a),
the firm could advocate the client's position, as stated in the docu-
ments, to others. Moreover, under Model Rule 4.1(b), even if the
firm came to know of the fraudulent nature of the documents, the
firm would be prohibited from disclosing such to others because
the information would be protected client information under
Model Rule 1.6.193
If the representations on behalf of the clients were made by the
188 Lincoln Savings and Loan Association v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 919-21. (D.D.C.
1990).189 See Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision v. Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler, Misc. No. 92-101, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition
for an Order to Show Cause and for Summary Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas
(Mar. 4, 1992); see also Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, The Banking Scandal: An Era of
New Standards for Professionals, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1992, at 1, 7.
190 See Alison Leigh Cowan, Big Law and Auditing Firms to Pay Millions in S & L Suit,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar, 31, 1992, at Al; Saundra Torry, War or Wakeup Call? Kaye, Scholer Case
Has Attorney's Wondering, WASH. PosT, Mar. 16, 1992, at F5; Donna K H. Walters, New
Liability Twist Has Lawyers, Accountants Scurrying, L.A. TMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at D1.
191 See OTS, Kaye Scholer Agree to Settle; Firm Will Pay $41 Million Restitution, 58
Banking Rep. 472 (BNA) (1992); see also Walters, supra note 190, at D1.
192 MODEL RULEs Rule 4.1(a)-(b) (Discussion Draft 1983).
193 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6; cf In re Q.P.M. Leasing Services, Report of Trustee, Reorg.
No. 81-B-10533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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law firm to a court, the Model Rules inquiry switches to Model
Rule 3.3. But, once again Model Rules 3.3(a)(1) and (2) prohibit a
lawyer from "'knowingly' making false statements of material fact
or law to a tribunal, 'knowingly' failing to disclose a material fact
to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act, or offering evidence that the lawyer
'knows' is false."' 94 Absent knowledge of the falsity of client docu-
ments, a lawyer is not restrained from advocating the same.
Although the commentary to Model Rule 3.3 provides that "a law-
yer has authority to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that
the lawyer believes is untrustworthy, " 195 there is no mandate to
refuse to offer such testimony.
Of course, if the judicial process was involved-as it is not in
hypothetical three-and if a lawyer learns that he or she has of-
fered evidence to a court that was false, then the only mandate of
disclosure under the Model Rules kicks in through Model Rule
3.3(a)(4). In such case, the Model Rule would require the lawyer
to take "reasonable remedial measures," including disclosure to
the court if that is the only measure which remedies the fraud on
the court.19
6
Assuming that after advocating on the clients' behalf, the law
firm comes to know of the falsity of the clients' documents submit-
ted to the Board and that the clients are involved in ongoing ille-
gal activity on account of such, and further assuming that the ju-
dicial process is not involved, there is no ability to disclose under
the Model Rules. As discussed above, Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) re-
moved previously existing lawyer discretion under the ABA Code
to disclose a client's intention to commit future crime with "only"
potential financial impact. 197 Notwithstanding the billions of dol-
lars of losses possibly to be occasioned by a client's ongoing or in-
tended future criminality of which a lawyer is aware, disclosure is
not appropriate.' 98
The outcome of nondisclosure would have been the same under
the ABA Code and Model Rules except in the instance where the
194 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3(a)(1), (2), (4) (Discussion Draft 1983).
195 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3 cmt. 14 (emphasis added).
196 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3(a)(4); see also MODEL RULEs Rule 3.3 cmt 11.
197 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(1).
198 See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.16(a)(1); MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6 cmts. 15-16; see also Ronald
D. Rotunda, Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Blow-
ing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REv. 455, 460 (1984).
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client is engaged in ongoing criminal activity of a financial nature
of which the law firm is aware. For example, if the law firms rep-
resenting Charles Keating, Lincoln Savings and Loan Association,
and the American Continental Corporation knew of their continu-
ing fraudulent financial criminal behavior, under Model Rule 1.6,
they could not disclose it, but under ABA Code Disciplinary Rule
4-101(C)(3) they could have done so. However, assuming the law
firm knew of the clients' past fraudulent activities, which were no
longer ongoing, but did not proffer such transactions as being
proper to the Board or other regulators at the time the that firm
knew them to be improper, the firm could not have disclosed the
clients' information under the ABA Code or Model Rules. As the
title of one commentator's column proclaimed in light of the
charges leveled against the law firms involved in this matter:
Lawyers Can't be Stool Pigeons.'99
In conclusion, hypothetical three was appropriately resolved by
the law firm under the Model Rules. While the rules opt for
mandatory disclosure of client fraud on the court, and permit dis-
closure of client confidences in lawyer in self-interest or self-de-
fense, they do not allow disclosure of client confidences in cases of
financial fraud on others-pure and simple.
D. Hypothetical Four
In this hypothetical, the criminal defendant, in the face of his
lawyer's threats of disclosure of any future perjury, testifies truth-
fully at trial. The defendant wanted to testify that he had seen
something, a silver object, in his victim's hand before he shot him.
The testimony would have been false and the defendant's lawyer
tells the defendant that he cannot perjure himself. Further, the
lawyer tells the defendant that if he, the defendant, commits per-
jury, the lawyer will withdraw and tell the court. In light of his
lawyer's threat of withdrawal and disclosure, the defendant testi-
fies truthfully, is convicted, and is sentenced to a long term of
imprisonment.2 °°
As should be clear from the above discussion of Model Rule
3.3(a)(4), the lawyer's conduct was proper. Model Rule 3.3(a)(4)
199 Marvin E. Frankel, Lawyers Can't Be Stool Pigeons, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 14, 1992, at
A25.
200 See supra note 19 (discussing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986)).
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states that a lawyer shall not knowingly offer evidence that the
lawyer knows to be false.20 1 And, coming to know of the falsity of
material evidence offered, the lawyer must, again under Model
Rule 3.3(a)(4), take reasonable remedial measures.2 °2
Reasonable remedial measures as defined in the Model Rules
commentary include remonstrating with the client confidentially,
seeking to withdraw, and ultimately, if need be, disclosing to the
court, all in an effort to have the client "remedy" the perjury.2 °3
Furthermore, "[t]he general rule-that an advocate must disclose
the existence of perjury with respect to a material fact, even that
of a client-applies to defense counsel in criminal cases, as well as
in other instances."20
4
Thus, under the Model Rules, the lawyer did the right thing.
He told the client that he would withdraw and reveal that the cli-
ent lied on the stand. Model Rule 3.3(a)(4), and its commentary,
envision such a result.20 5 And, Model Rule 3.3(b) specifically notes
that the duties under Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) "apply even if compli-
ance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Model Rule 1.6. "2o6
Notwithstanding United States Supreme Court commentary to
the contrary, this result most likely would not have been counte-
nanced under the ABA Code provisions. I say "United States
Supreme Court commentary to the contrary" because in 1986, the
Supreme Court decided the case of Nix v. Whiteside,2 °7 on which
this hypothetical is based. In Nix, the Court considered whether a
criminal defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel
when his lawyer threatened to advise the trial court of his inten-
tion to commit perjury and also threatened to withdraw from rep-
resentation. 20 The Court concluded that the lawyer's conduct did
not rise to the level of prejudice required for a finding that the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated.209
Yet, the Court in Nix did not stop at the constitutional issue.
201 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3(a)(4).
202 Id.
203 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3 cmt. 11.
204 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3 cmt. 12.
205 See MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3(b).
206 MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.3(b).
207 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
208 Id. at 159.
209 Id. at 175.
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The five Justices in the majority proclaimed that the defense law-
yer had acted ethically under applicable rules of professional con-
duct 210 by threatening the client with revelation of the perjury
and withdrawal if the client went forward with his false testi-
mony.211 The four concurring Justices, however, did not agree.
Justice William Brennan, in one of the concurring opinions, noted
that the majority's "essay regarding what constitutes the correct
response to a criminal client's suggestion that he will perjure him-
self is pure discourse without force of law."212 Justice Brennan
stated it was unfortunate that the majority seemed "unable to re-
sist the temptation of sharing with the legal community its vision
of ethical conduct," when it was clear, at least to Justice Brennan,
that "the Court cannot tell the States or the lawyers in the States
how to behave in their courts...." 213 Also, Justice Harry Black-
mun in writing another concurrence, stated that the only appro-
priate question before the Court was whether the defendant was
deprived of his Sixth Amendment guarantees and not "h]ow a de-
fense lawyer ought to act when faced with a client who intends to
commit perjury at trial.... "214
Further, the Nix Court cited the ABA Code, Disciplinary Rules
7-102(B)(1) and Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) as standing for the proposi-
tion that "the legal profession has accepted that a lawyer's ethical
duty to advance the interests of his [or her] client is limited by an
equally solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of pro-
fessional conduct; it specifically ensures that the client may not
use false evidence."215 The Court noted that the offense of perjury
was a crime at common law216 and is now a felony in most states
by statute, including Iowa, the state at issue.217 Pursuant to the
Iowa statute, "[a] lawyer who aids false testimony by questioning
a witness when perjurious responses can be anticipated, risks
prosecution for subornation of perjury under the Iowa Code
210 Id. at 171.
211 475 U.S. 157, 166-171 (1986).
212 Id. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring).
213 Id. (emphasis in original).
214 Id. at 177-78 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
215 475 U.S. at 168 (footnote omitted) (Model Rules not only authorize an attorney to
disclose a client's perjury but also require such disclosure to the court).
216 Id. at 169 (discussing punishment for assisting or partaking in perjurious testimony);
see also 1 WiLLLm But IcK, LAW OF CRmwE 475 (1976).
217 475 U.S. at 169; see IOWA CODE § 720.2 (1985) (perjury is a class A felony).
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"218
The Court then went on to say that "[i]t is universally agreed
that at minimum the lawyer's first duty when confronted with a
proposal for perjurious testimony is to attempt to dissuade the cli-
ent from the unlawful course of conduct."219 Referring to the com-
mentary to the Model Rules, even though the rules were not at
issue in the case, the Court stated "that a lawyer's revelation of
his [or her] client's perjury to the court is a professionally respon-
sible and acceptable response to the conduct of a client who has
actually given perjured testimony .. . [W]ithdrawal from repre-
sentation [is] an appropriate response of a lawyer when the client
threatens to commit perjury. "220 Moreover, "under no circum-
stance may a lawyer either advocate or passively tolerate a client's
giving of false testimony."221 The Court described these points as
being "accepted norms of professional conduct," which "would [not]
in any sense make out a deprivation of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel."222
The Court's position in Nix, as to what constituted appropriate
professional conduct, has been criticized for a number of reasons.
First, the majority, perhaps inappropriately, voiced professional
conduct standards for the states without the power to do so. 223
218 475 U.S. at 169; see IOWA CODE § 720.3 (1985) (suborning perjury is a class D felony).
219 475 U.S. at 169; see MODEL RuLE 3.3 cmt. (1983). "Lawyer should seek to persuade
client that the evidence [testimony] should not be offered." Id.; see also Steven H. Goldberg,
Heaven Help the Lawyer for a Civil Liar, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 885,906-07 (1989) (failure
to take action by dissuading is "assisting within the contemplation of the Model Rules").
220 475 U.S. at 170 (emphasis added) (noting that conflicts of interest may arise, such as
a mistrial); see US ex. rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1977). The trial
judge stated that if the defendant insisted upon testifying he would permit the defendant's
attorney to withdraw and force the defendant to represent himself. Id. The Third Circuit
held that if counsel withdrew, the defendant was entitled to substitute counsel. Id. See
generally Kevin A. Pituch, Good Grades for Attorneys Nix v. Whiteside and the Supreme
Court's Requirement That Counsel Disclose Client Perjury, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 185, 213-14
(1987) (advocating attorney's right to withdraw because it preserves a defendant's right to
testify and yet permits an attorney to refuse to aid and abet perjury).
221 475 U.S. at 171; see U.S. v. Lang, 857 F.2d 436, 445 (8th Cir. 1988). "[Elven a state-
ment of an intention to lie on the stand does not necessarily mean the client will indeed lie
on the stand." Id.; People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 11 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (lawyer re-
fused testimony that would support defendant's spurious defense of alibi). See generally
Brent Appel, The Limited Impact of Nix v. Whiteside on an Attorney-Client Relation, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 1913, 1927 (1988) (defendant's right to take stand is so fundamental that no
lawyer should be allowed to deter).
222 475 U.S. at 171; see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (discussing Sixth
Amendment violation and need for actual conflict of interest adversely affecting lawyer's
performance); Charles F. Thompson, Jr., The Attorney's Ethical Obligation When Faced
with Client Perjury, 42 S.C. L. REV. 973, 984-85 (1991) (ABA concluded that lawyer's pro-
fessional responsibility could not be inconsistent with Constitutional requirement).
223 See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 169, 176 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that
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Moreover, it is apparent "that the trial lawyer's conduct approved
by the majority in Nix represented [in the view of some commenta-
tors] a radical departure from traditional, standard practice,"
under the ABA Code.224 The "traditional" model mandated with-
drawal from the case and not threatened revelation. While the
Model Rules have departed from such "tradition" in the case of
past client perjury, and now allows revelation, the approach under
the ABA Code was not the same.225
The ABA Code, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), mandated that a
lawyer reveal a client's perjury perpetrated on a person or tribu-
nal and committed during the representation, except when the in-
formation regarding the perjury was protected as a privileged
communication.22 6 A brief synopsis of the ABA Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics Opinions concerning disclosure of client perjury
or fraud illustrates the Supreme Court's erroneous interpretation
of the ABA Code's disclosure requirements.
Prior to the adoption of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), there
were several ethical opinions concerning this subject rendered
under the ABA Canons. These opinions discussed the conflict be-
tween the confidentiality and disclosure of fraud provisions of the
ABA Canons. In 1945, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics
held that a lawyer could not reveal a client's fraudulent claims of
residence to a court.227 The Committee stated: "While ordinarily
it is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to disclose to the
court any fraud that [the lawyer] believes is being practiced on the
court, this does not transcend that to preserve client confi-
courts have no constitutional or statutory authority to create rules of ethical conduct for
attorneys or to adjudicate matters of legal ethics). See generally Thompson, supra note 222,
at 986 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 353).
"The lawyer is, of course, to comply with the [state] constitutional requirement rather than
the ethical one." Id.
224 See FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHmics, supra note 160, at 139.
225 See Carl A. Auerback, What Are Law Clerks for?-Comments on Nix v. Whiteside, 23
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 979 (1986); Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Per-
jury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1939, 1939 (1988); Linda H. Gottlieb,
Pinocchio for the Defense, 14 FiA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 891 (1987).
226 ABA CODE DR 7-102(BX1) ("The lawyer shall reveal the fraud to the affected person
or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a confidence or secret."); see Nix.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 169, 174 (1986). In discussing the attorney's duty to repeat possible
client perjury, the majority states that it extends to a "client's announced plans to engage
in future criminal conduct." Id. But see U.S. v. ITT, 349 F. Supp. 22, 29 (D. Conn. 1972)
("Generally speaking, only the most egregious conduct, such as bribery... will constitute
fraud on the court ....').
227 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 268 (1945) (discuss-
ing Canon 37 dealing with preserving client confidences).
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dences."228 In 1965, the Committee held that a lawyer could not
reveal, in a divorce case, that his client was pregnant by another
man.
2 29
The Committee, in a well known opinion, held that with respect
to past client perjury, the client confidentiality protection of the
ABA Canons outweighed the disclosure provisions. 230 The Com-
mittee held that, as such, an lawyer who had secured a divorce for
a client could not reveal to the court the client's previous commis-
sion of perjury when the lawyer later learned of it. 231 The Com-
mittee held that the lawyer should urge the client to disclose the
perjury to the court and, if the client did not to do so, the lawyer
should withdraw.232 However, due to lawyer-client confidentiality,
the lawyer could not reveal the fraud.233
In 1975, the ABA Committee revisited the issue of whether a
client's past fraud or perjury committed during the representation
should be disclosed, but this time under the guise of the ABA
Code.234 In ABA Formal Opinion No. 341, the Committee held
that the 1974 Amendment to Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), that
excepted from disclosure information about client fraud protected
under the attorney-client privilege, "was necessary in order to re-
lieve lawyers of exposure to... diametrically opposed professional
duties."235 The Committee stated that the 1974 Amendment rein-
228 Id. See generally Goldberg, supra note 219, at 917-19 (discussing how an attorney
should handle untruthful client under the Model Rules).
229 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 869 (1965) (attor-
ney should advise client that he should be truthful if questioned under oath or he should
assert Fifth Amendment privilege).
230 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953); see JoHN
H. WiGMORE, 13 WIGMORE ON EvIDEN E § 2292 (3d ed. 1940) ("Where legal advice... is
sought from a [lawyer]... communications are at his instance permanently protected from
disclosure by himself .... ").
231 WIGMORE, supra note 230 (client disclosed to attorney when seeking advice in a pro-
fessional capacity).
232 WiGMoRE, supra note 230; see Abraham Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Confiden-
tiality, 13 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 11, 16-17 (1985) (relating to disclosure as opposed to with-
drawal, an attorney does not necessarily have to reveal a client's previous crime absent
client consent).
233 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953). The
committee addressed the question of what a lawyer should do when the client is to be sen-
tenced based on misinformation about the client's lack of a previous criminal record. Id.
The Committee held that, if the attorney learned of the client's previous record through
client communications, the lawyer had no duty to correct the misinformation. Id. But, if the
lawyer did not learn of the record from the client and the lawyer believed the court relied
on the lawyer's silence as "corroboration," the lawyer "should inform the court not to rely on
his [or her] silence as corroboration." Id.
234 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
235 Id.
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stated "the essence" of ABA Formal Opinion No. 287, that a law-
yer should not disclose a client's fraud. The Committee further
stated that it was "unthinkable" that a lawyer "be subject to disci-
plinary action for failing to reveal information, which by law is not
to be revealed without the consent of the client .... 26
Thus, under Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), disclosure by the
lawyer could not take the place of information "protected as a priv-
ileged communication." 23 7 The Committee interpreted the phrase
"privileged communication" to mean "those confidences and
secrets that are required to be preserved by Disciplinary Rule 4-
101. " 238 However, the Committee held that such interpretation
did not "wipe out" the disclosure provisions of Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(B)(1) because not all information of client fraud which comes
to a lawyer would be considered "privileged" under Disciplinary
Rule 4-101.239 For example, the Committee noted:
[T~he duty imposed by Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) would re-
main in force if the information clearly establishing a fraud
on a person or tribunal and committed by a client in the
course of representation were obtained by the lawyer from a
third party (but not in connection with [the lawyer's] profes-
sional relationship with the client), because it would not be a
confidence or secret of a client entitled to confidentiality.24 °
Interestingly, the Committee, in ABA Formal Opinion No. 341,
made a statement about disclosure of future fraud, which would
make the "before" perjury threat in Nix cognizable under the ABA
Code, as well as Model Rules. The Committee discussed remain-
ing disclosure provisions under the ABA Code:
Disciplinary Rule 4-102(C) sets out several circumstances
under which revelation of a secret or confidence is permissi-
ble, and thus in cases where these exceptions apply, Discipli-
nary Rule 7-102(B) may make the optional disclosure of infor-
mation under Disciplinary Rule 4-101 a mandatory one. For
example, when disclosure is required by a law, the "privileged
communication" exception of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) is not
236 Id.
237 ABA CODE DR 7-102(B)(1).
23 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
239 Id.
240 Id.
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applicable and disclosure may be required. 241
The Committee also defined information "clearly establishing"
fraud as "the sense of active fraud, with a requirement of scienter
or intent to deceive."242
Indeed, under Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3), a lawyer may have
had the discretion to disclose the announced intention of a client
to commit the crime of perjury. Such discretion could be exercised
to disclose the client's intent prior to the client actually testifying
falsely. 243 There are those who disagree with this view, finding
perjury to fall "outside of the future crime exception."244
In 1978, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics considered
a situation where two opposing clients had created a fictitious car
accident in order to defraud an insurance company.245 Although
the case had been filed and fraudulent deposition testimony given,
the case was dismissed by the lawyers once the deception was dis-
covered. Inasmuch as the fraud "had never been consummated,"
the Committee considered it "quite debatable whether or not a
fraud had been perpetrated upon a person or tribunal within the
meaning of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)." 246 Moreover, even if a
fraud had been committed, the Committee reasoned that the dis-
closure by the clients to the lawyers was "protected as a privileged
communication."
24 7
However, after the Model Rules were adopted, the ABA Com-
mittee "reconsidered" its 1953 and 1975 Opinions, Nos. 287 and
341, as well as others concerning revealing past client perjury.248
The Committee held in 1987 that Model Rules 3.3(a) and (b)
represented:
a major policy change with regard to the lawyer's duty as
stated in Formal Opinions 287 and 341 when the client testi-
fies falsely. It is now mandatory under these ... provisions,
for a lawyer, who knows the client has committed perjury, to
241 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
242 Id.
243 See Massachusetts Bar Opinion No. 89-1 (1989).
244 FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHIcs, supra note 160, at 137; accord Daniel Kiubock, When
Your Client is About to Commit Fraud, 16 MAss. LAWYERS WEEKLY 1713 (1988); Daniel
Klubock, Bar Counsel Responds, 17 MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY 977 (1989).
245 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 1416 (1978).
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 353 (1987).
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disclose this knowledge to the tribunal if the lawyer cannot
persuade the client to rectify the perjury.249
Thus, as clearly indicated in its 1987 opinion, ABA Formal
Opinion No. 353, and in light of the new Model Rules, the ABA
Committee's position on the disclosure of client fraud or perjury
clearly has changed from the views discussed in prior ethical opin-
ions. Confidentiality is no longer favored over disclosure; indeed,
just the opposite under the Model Rules. As such, the lawyer ac-
ted appropriately under the Model Rules in representing that he
would have to reveal the past perjury if it was committed by the
client.
It is also clear that under the Model Rules, the lawyer acted
appropriately in letting the client testify after he had informed
him of his intention to lie. In its same 1987 opinion, the ABA
Committee held that under the Model Rules:
[M]andatory disclosure . .. [was not] necessarily triggered
when a client states an intention to testify falsely, but has not
yet done so. Ordinarily, after warning the client of the conse-
quences of the client's perjury, including the lawyer's duty to
disclose it to the court, the lawyer can reasonably believe that
the client will be persuaded not to testify falsely at trial. That
is exactly what happened in Nix v. Whiteside. Under these
circumstances, the lawyer may permit the client to testify and
may examine the client in the normal manner.2 50
Discussion of what to do about future perjury would not be com-
plete, however, without reference to the American Bar Association
Standards Relating to Criminal Justice (the "ABA Standards").2 51
Just prior to consideration in 1979, there was a provision in the
ABA Standards concerning the responsibilities of a criminal de-
fense lawyer regarding the testimony of a defendant. It provided:
(a) If the defendant has admitted to defense counsel facts
which establish guilt and counsel's independent investigation
established that the admissions are true but the defendant
249 Id.
250 Id.; cf ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1318
(1975).
251 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. The ABA
Standards consist of Prosecution and Defense Functions. They first appeared in 1971. See
ABA STANDARDS (Approved Draft 1971). Thereafter, they were promulgated. See ABA
STANDARDS (1974) (amended 1982 & 1992).
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insists on the right to trial, counsel must strongly discourage
the defendant against taking the witness stand to testify
perjuriously.
(b) If, in advance of trial, the defendant insists that he or she
will take the stand to testify perjuriously, the lawyer may
withdraw from the case, if that is feasible, seeking leave of
the court if necessary, but the court should not be advised of
the lawyer's reason for seeking to do so.
(c) If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permit-
ted by the court, or if the situation arises immediately preced-
ing trial or during the trial and the defendant insists upon
testifying perjuriously in his or her own behalf, it is unprofes-
sional conduct for the lawyer to lend aid to the perjury or use
the perjured testimony. Before the defendant takes the stand
in these circumstances, the lawyer should make a record of
the fact that the defendant is taking the stand against the
advice of counsel in some appropriate manner without re-
vealing the fact to the court. The lawyer may identify the wit-
ness as the defendant and may ask appropriate questions of
the defendant when it is believed the defendant's answers will
not be perjurious. As to matters for which it is believed the
defendant will offer perjurious testimony, the lawyer should
seek to avoid direct examination of the defendant in the con-
ventional manner; instead, the lawyer should ask the defend-
ant if he or she wishes to make any additional statement con-
cerning the case to the trier or triers of the facts. A lawyer
may not later argue the defendant's known false version of
facts to the jury as worthy of belief, and may not recite or rely
upon the false testimony in his or her closing argument.25 2
The proposed Standard was withdrawn, and thus, not consid-
ered by the ABA. Yet, although it "[was not the] official policy of
the ABA some courts . . . nevertheless endorsed the
[s]tandard's recommended procedures."253  However, several
others, including former Chief Justice Warren Burger in Nix v.
Whiteside, have criticized the proposed ABA Standards.2 5 '
252 ABA STANDARDS 4-7.7 (Proposed Standards) was approved by the ABA Standing
Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice, but not submitted to the ABA
House of Delegates and never adopted.
253 ABA STANDARDS 4-7.7 cmt. (Proposed Standard); see MASSACHUSETTS DEFENSE FUNC-
TION 13(b) which can be read as following Proposed Standard 4-7.7 to the extent that it does
not prohibit "defense counsel from allowing a defendant to testify falsely if all other efforts
to deter such testimony have failed, or if the lawyer learns of the intended false testimony
at trial." See TUONI, supra note 125, at 10-55; see also Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in
Criminal Cases: Still in Search of an Answer, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 521, 522 (1988).
254 See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 169 n.6 (1986); see also MODEL RULES Rule 3.3
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In conclusion, the lawyer's behavior was appropriate under the
Model Rules. While some commentators have suggested a lawyer
making sure his client tells the truth is not to be encouraged,255
surely it does give pause that under the Model Rules a lawyer
must disclose perjury, yet cannot disclose financial harm, and only
may disclose future criminal conduct resulting in murder or great
bodily harm. The drafters of the Model Rules opted for an extraor-
dinarily high level of protection of the judicial process, over turn-
ing years of precedent. But they did not simultaneously reinstate
previously existing protections for society and individuals. As
noted below, such decision-making seems odd if not outrageous
and potentially of great danger to the continued self-regulation of
the bar.
E. Hypothetical Five
The Model Rules supported the lawyer's disclosures of confiden-
tial information in defense of the lawyer.256 Model Rule 1.6(b)(2)
liberalized prior ABA Code provisions concerning lawyer disclo-
sure of confidential client information in self-defense. Under this
provision, a lawyer may reveal information necessary "to establish
a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy be-
tween the lawyer and client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the cli-
ent."257 The commentary to this Model Rule states that "[t]he law-
yer's right to respond arises when an assertion of complicity has
been made."258 However, the commentary further provides that
this rule "does not require the lawyer to await the commencement
of an action or proceeding that charges complicity, so that the de-
fense may be established by responding directly to a third party
who has made such an assertion."259
The only limitations as to the extent of the lawyer's discretion-
ary disclosures under Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) also appear in the com-
cmt. 9; FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHics, supra note 160, at 118.
255 See FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHics, supra note 160, at 118.
256 See supra note 20 (discussing Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire Insur. Co., 497 F.2d 1190
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974)).
257 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(2).
258 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6 cmt. 17.
259 Id. (emphasis added).
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mentary to the rule. It reads:
Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability
to establish the defense, the lawyer should advise the client of
the third party's assertion and request that the client respond
appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater
than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate
innocence, the disclosure should be made in a manner which
limits access to the information to the tribunal or other per-
sons having a need to know it, and appropriate protective or-
ders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to
the fullest extent practicable.26 °
Under these provisions, the lawyer arguably was justified in
both disclosures he made of confidential information. The first
disclosure was made to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "SEC") before any allegation against the lawyer of wrongful
conduct had occurred. Since the commentary to Model Rule
1.6(b)(2) provides that the rule "does not require the lawyer to
await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges
complicity," 261 and since the lawyer did not wait for any charges to
be brought, presumably the initial disclosure would be counte-
nanced. The only difficulty with such analysis is that the "liberal"
language of the Model Rule's commentary just cited is modified by
the phrase: "so that the defense may be established by responding
directly to a third party who has made such an assertion."262 In
this hypothetical, there was no charge pending, and there was
also an absence of an assertion or accusation against the lawyer in
question. Thus, the quoted language of the commentary to Model
Rule 1.6(b)(2) does not comport with the lawyer's actions, making
"offensive" rather than "defensive" disclosures to the SEC. Conse-
quently, notwithstanding the lack of a client or third-party accu-
sation before the lawyer made the initial disclosure, it is not far-
fetched to presume that the lawyer was making the disclosure to
"defend" himself against potential future accusations, which of
course, did eventuate.
However, there is no doubt that the second disclosure, to the
lawyers for the plaintiff investors of the lawyer's former client,
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
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was permitted under Model Rule 1.6(b)(2). At least two provisions
of the Model Rule appear to be applicable. The lawyer's second
disclosures would have been for the purpose either of establishing
"a defense to a ... civil claim against the lawyer based upon con-
duct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations
in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client."2 6 3 Clearly, the wide berth given to a lawyer under these
two clauses of Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) would permit the second dis-
closure under the facts of hypothetical five.
It should be noted that, although not explicitly referenced under
prior ABA Code provisions, at least one court applying the ABA
Code did not quarrel with the entirety of a lawyer's disclosures in
the precise manner referenced in this hypothetical. In 1974,
shortly after the ABA Code was adopted, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Meyerhofer v. Empire
Fire Marine Insurance Co. ,264 on which hypothetical five is based.
Applying the ABA Code provisions, the Second Circuit approved of
the lawyer's second disclosure of confidential information in order
to avoid being named in a lawsuit by investors of the lawyer's for-
mer client. Pursuant to the ABA Code provision, such disclosure
would have been made in order "to defend [the lawyer]... against
an accusation of wrongful conduct."265 However, the Second Cir-
cuit did not comment on the first disclosure by the lawyer to the
SEC other than noting it. No provision of the ABA Code presuma-
bly would have allowed such disclosure as no "accusation" had
been levied against the lawyer. The lawyer made the initial dis-
closure apparently because he disagreed with the manner in
which his firm had handled the client's stock registration state-
ment.2 66 While such disclosure may have been defensively ori-
ented, looking to potential future accusations which did in fact
arise, such approach does appear appropriate under the ABA Code
provision.
Clearly, Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) goes much further than ABA Code,
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(c)(4) in permitting lawyer "self-defense"
disclosures. The commentary to the Model Rule further liberal-
izes its approach. As such, simultaneous with restricting lawyer
263 MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6(b)(2).
264 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
265 ABA CODE DR 4-101(C)(4).
266 Empire Fire, 497 F.2d at 1193.
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discretion to disclose client confidential information to protect
others from wrongdoing, the Model Rules have enhanced lawyer
self-interest and self-defense protections. Accompanying this en-
largement of lawyer discretion to disclose confidences to protect
themselves has been the mandate to disclose client information to
protect the judicial process from fraud. Such hierarchy of protec-
tions, putting the courts and lawyers on the top, clients a close
second, but the public and non-client individuals on the far "non-
protection" end of the continuum is, at least, in this author's as-
sessment, not only "strange" but also indefensible.
IV. RETHIKING CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
Much literature has been written about the rationale behind the
protections of client confidences. 267 Briefly, the arguments range
from claims that allowing in-roads to client confidentially protec-
tions would chill client communications,268 to arguments that un-
fettered confidentiality allows lawyers to more adequately per-
form their roles as advisors and be able to counsel clients against
their intended improper behavior without client fear of retribu-
tion.269 Whatever the rationale behind client confidentiality, there
do seem to be alternatives which do not so blatantly place the pro-
fession's desired protections before the public interest. Sugges-
tions of alternatives to strict client confidentiality are not new.
Some are broadside attacks on the entire justice system. For ex-
ample, Judge Marvin E. Frankel stated eighteen years ago that
the adversary ideal must be modified, with truth being the para-
mount objective of lawyers, not the advancement of the client's in-
terest.270 In such a system, the lawyer as truth-seeker, rather
than combatant, would take on more of an "inquisitorial" role and
267 See supra notes 60-74 (discussing attorney-client evidentiary privilege).
268 See Deborah Abramovsky, Confidentiality: The Future Crime-Contraband Dilemmas,
85 W. VA. L. REV. 929, 931 (1983); Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients
About Limits on Confidentiality," 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 441, 444-46 (1990); Timothy J.
Miller, Note, The Attorney's Duty to Reveal a Client's Intended Future Criminal Conduct,
DuKE L.J. 582, 593 (1984).
269 See supra note 267. But see Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and
Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015 (1981) (argues that mistrust pervades relations between attor-
neys and clients notwithstanding protections of client confidentiality).
270 Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpirical View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1031 (1975). Judge Frankel is critical of a system of justice that rewards "techniques
which make a witness look unreliable although the look stems only from the counsel's arti-
fice, cunning questions that stop short of discomforting revelations, [and] complacent ex-
perts for whom some shopping may have been necessary." Id. at 1039.
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report all relevant evidence, untrue statements, or omission of
material facts by his or her client to the court, however damaging
to clients.271
More recent alternatives focus on limiting the extent of protec-
tions to address other vital interests. For example, in 1985 Pro-
fessor Harry I. Subin proposed a rule of "limited-use" disclo-
sure.2 72 Professor Subin analogized to the lawyer's duty to disclose
tangible evidence which comes into a lawyer's possession via a cli-
ent.273 Professor Subin would have rules mandating disclosure
when a lawyer learns a client is or will engage in felonious conduct
and the lawyer's attempt to persuade the client otherwise fails.
274
But if the information is privileged, the information would not be
used against the client.275 Thus, the public and the courts would
be protected and the client would not suffer as a result of lawyer
disclosure.
So-called "use immunity" has arisen in many jurisdictions in the
context of a lawyer who receives, from a client, physical or tangi-
ble evidence related to the commission of a crime. The ABA Code
prohibits a lawyer from concealing or knowingly failing to disclose
that which the lawyer is required by law to reveal. 6 Several
courts support the proposition that a lawyer "may be under spe-
cial obligations to preserve physical evidence that is adverse to a
client's interests and possibly to turn the evidence over to the
prosecutor."
2 77
271 Id. at 1057-1058. For critical commentary on Judge Frankel's suggestion see Albert
W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349 (1981)
(pointing out that required disclosure would be likely to discourage clients from "leveling"
with attorneys, thus deterring search for truth); Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel's
Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060, 1060 (1975) (finding fault with the basic premise
that adversarial relationship is harmful to goal of truth-seeking); William T. Pizzi, Judge
Frankel and the Adversary System," 52 U. CoLo. L. REV. 357, 357 (1981) (suggesting more
modest changes inspired by civil law).
272 Harry I. Subin, The Lawyers Superego: Disclosures of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IowA L. REv. 1091, 1091 (1985).
273 Id. at 1123.
274 Id. at 1179. The author limits this type of disclosure to felonies for various reasons,
including greater moral culpability and public outrage. Id. at 1176.
275 Id. at 1179.
276 ABA CODE DR 7-102(AX3).
277 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs 645 (1986). There is, of course, a
concurrent obligation on the part of attorneys not to destroy evidence; see JAMIE S. GORE-
LICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 256 (1989). The ABA CODE provisions which gener-
ally relate to this duty are found in Canon 7, as well as DR 7-102(A)(3), (7) (prohibiting
counsel from assisting client in illegal conduct); (8) (prohibiting counsel from engaging in
conduct contrary to Disciplinary Rules); and 7-109(A) (prohibiting counsel from sup-
pressing evidence that he is legally obligated to produce).
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In People v. Meredith,278 the Supreme Court of California held
that a lawyer who directed a defense investigator to retrieve a vic-
tim's partially burnt wallet in a trash can and thereafter ex-
amined it, could not subsequently claim the attorney-client privi-
lege for the location of the evidence.2 7 9 In Morrell v. State,2 0 a
"kidnapping plan" written by the client and left in the client's car
was found by another individual who turned it over to the lawyer.
The lawyer then instructed the individual to give the plan to the
police. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that by doing so the
lawyer had not breached an ethical obligation to his client, nor
were his services to the client ineffective.2"' The court held that "a
criminal defense lawyer must turn over to the prosecution real ev-
idence that the lawyer obtains from his [or her] client. Further, if
the evidence is obtained from a nonclient third party who is not
acting for the client, the ... [attorney-client] privilege ... is inap-
plicable."28 2 In 1979, a California appellate court held that the at-
torney-client privilege did not give a lawyer the right to withhold
evidence.28 3 The court stated that it would be an abuse of the law-
yer's duty of professional responsibility to knowingly "take posses-
sion of and secrete instrumentalities of a crime."284 The Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in In re Ryder,
held that the fruits and instrumentality of a crime, specifically
money and a gun, could not be withheld by a lawyer on the
grounds of the attorney-client privilege.28 5
However, the Supreme Court of Washington, in State v.
Olwell,28 6 held that a knife in the possession of defense counsel
could be withheld by the lawyer for "a reasonable period" of
The Model Rules, however, are more specific in directly prohibiting the destruction of
evidence. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.4(a). "A lawyer shall not... unlawfully obstruct another
party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other mate-
rial having potential evidentiary value." Id.
278 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981).
279 Id. at 52-54. The court reasoned that this was a purely tactical move by the defense,
concluding that "[i]f defense counsel leaves the evidence where he discovers it, his observa-
tions derived from privileged communications are insulated from revelation. If, however,
counsel chooses to remove evidence to examine or test it, the original location and the con-
dition of the evidence loses the protection of the privilege." Id. at 54.
280 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978).
281 Id. at 1210-1211.
282 Id. at 1210.
283 People v. Lee, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 716 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
284 Id. at 722.
285 263 F. Supp. 360, 365 (E.D. Va. 1967).
286 394 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964).
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time.28 7 However, the court stated that "[t]he lawyer should not be
a depository for criminal evidence .... It follows that the lawyer,
after a reasonable period, should, as an officer of the court, on
his [or her] own motion turn the [evidence] over to the
prosecution."28 8
The approach of these cases has been followed in other jurisdic-
tions.28 9 Courts seem to be in agreement that a defense lawyer
must turn over "either the products of apparent crime ... or in-
strumentalities of crime .... [And] [some courts have gone fur-
ther and have required defense lawyers to turn over evidence that
is neither contraband nor instrumentality."290
Commentators have noted:
[C]ourts have drawn the line at the turn-over obligation just
described and have generally protected under the attorney-
client privilege the lawyer's information about the source of
the incriminating evidence if that source is the lawyer's cli-
ent. The privilege is waived, however, if the lawyer came into
possession of the evidence unlawfully or if the lawyer has al-
tered the location or changed the appearance of the
evidence.29 1
Professor Subin advocates this approach so that a lawyer can
prevent a client from committing a crime without directly incrimi-
nating the client.292 So called "use immunity" could prevent subse-
quent prosecution of the client based solely on the information
287 Id. at 684.
288 Id. The court cautioned that:
the attorney-client privilege should and can be preserved even though the attorney
surrenders the evidence he [or she] has in his [or her] possession. The prosecution,
upon receipt of such evidence from an attorney, where charge against the attorney's
client is contemplated (presently or in the future), should be well aware of the exist-
ence of the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, the State, when attempting to intro-
duce such evidence at trial, should take extreme precautions to make certain that the
source of the evidence is not disclosed in the presence of the jury and prejudicial error
is not committed. By thus allowing the prosecution to recover such evidence, the public
interest is served, and by refusing the prosecution an opportunity to disclose the source
of the evidence, the client's privilege is preserved and a balance is reached between
these conflicting interests. The burden of introducing such evidence at a trial would
continue to be upon the prosecution.
Id. at 684-85 (footnote omitted).
289 See People v. Investigation into a Certain Weapon, 113 Misc. 2d 348, 348, 448
N.Y.S.2d 950, 951 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1982).
290 See WoLFRAM, supra note 277, at 645 (footnotes omitted).
291 Id.; see People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46, 53 (Cal. 1981); In re Abuzza, 178 A.D. 757,
758, 166 N.Y.S. 105, 106 (1st Dep't 1917); Oklahoma Bar Association v. Harlton, 669 P.2d
774, 777 (Okla. 1983).
292 Subin, supra note 272.
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given to the authorities by his own lawyer. Conversely,
mandatory disclosure of the client's intentions by the lawyer could
prevent harm to others.
Professor William H. Simon proposed the exercise of "ethical
discretion," which would enable lawyers to take those actions
most likely to promote justice.293 Yet, his analysis focused only on
civil practice. He feared that there would be too many "qualifica-
tions and elaborations," presumably constitutional in the main, in
the criminal field for the exercise of such discretion.294
Suggested is a hybrid of the Subin and Simon models,
mandatory disclosure in cases wherein a client intended grave
physical harm or death to another, whether or not criminal, and
discretionary disclosure in other situations where the lawyer pre-
viously had discretion to disclose under the ABA Code.295 Under
such system of professional conduct, the public, innocent individu-
als, the courts, lawyers, and clients would be, for all intents and
purposes, equally protected.
Lawyers should have broader discretion to disclose the an-
nounced intentions of clients to engage in criminal conduct. Man-
dated disclosure would exist only as to those crimes and other
noncriminal acts likely to seriously physically harm or kill an-
other. Where necessary to promote justice or protect against other
harm to innocent third parties, "ethical discretion" to disclose
would be permitted, even in criminal cases. "Use immunity" would
be utilized in all situations. As such, a lawyer's disclosures,
whether to prevent harmful conduct, physical or financial, or to
promote justice, societal or individual interests, would not rever-
berate to the client's detriment and constitutional problems would
be avoided.296
The "hybrid" system might be best described in reference to the
hypotheticals discussed above. Under such a system, the lawyer
for the codefendant in hypothetical one could disclose to the court
that his client had told him that the other defendant did not com-
mit the crime. Yet, such disclosure, permitted in order to save an
innocent third party from harm as well as to promote the adminis-
293 William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083 (1988).
294 Id. at 1084.
295 See Subin, supra note 272, at 1128-32 (discussion of value of public interest in choice
of counsel questions arising under Sixth Amendment).
296 Id. at 1125-26; see also Pizzimenti, supra note 268, at 451.
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tration of justice, would not be admissible against the codefend-
ant. The disclosure would be mandatory if the innocent defendant
was likely to be greatly physically harmed or to suffer death as a
result of the mistake. Of course, whether the court would believe
the defendant's exoneration of the codefendant is not certain.
Whatever the court's decision, however, it would at least be en-
lightened by the exculpatory evidence given by the codefendant's
lawyer-presumably of high probative value.
In hypothetical two, after the death of the client, the lawyer, in
the interests of justice and society, would be permitted to disclose
what his client had told him about the past crimes prior to the
client's suicide. The balancing test of weighing the interests of so-
ciety against protections of the client would be employed. Indeed,
in the case of discretionary disclosures made solely to benefit the
administration of justice, such balancing inquiry would be the
only method for disclosure. In hypothetical two, the balance
would weigh heavily in favor of disclosure given the strong socie-
tal interests in the information and less demanding needs for cli-
ent confidentiality.
In hypothetical three, discretionary disclosure on the part of
lawyer to prevent future financial crime would be reinstated
under the new proposed approach to confidentiality. However, ac-
companying the same would be "use immunity" so that the law-
yer's revelation could not be used against the clients in subse-
quent criminal prosecutions or civil lawsuits. Should such have
been an option in the savings and loan events of the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the possibility exists that millions of dollars lost
to investors as well as taxpayers would have been saved.
In the context of protecting the judicial system, as in hypotheti-
cal four, or in protecting lawyers, as in hypothetical five, discre-
tionary disclosure also would be retained. Yet, the judicial sys-
tem, under the new approach to confidentiality, would not be
vaulted over the interests of individuals and clients. As such,
mandatory disclosure of past fraud on the court would be once
again eliminated, comporting with scores of precedent in this area
in effect prior to adoption of the Model Rules. In effect, there
would no longer be a "hierarchy" of protections under such revised
code of professional conduct. The new approach to confidentiality
would employ discretionary disclosure "across-the-board," except
in instances of the most grave client intended future physical
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harm.
The emphasis of such a new system would be on the lawyer's
appropriate exercise of discretion in deciding to disclose as well as
on the protection of human life. This would not be the first time a
code of conduct relied on the good judgment of lawyers, and as
well, placed high ethical value on the well being of others.29 v
The decision not to disclose should, of course, not be second-
guessed or provide the groundwork for lawyer liability except in
the most extreme situations, i.e., where life clearly was at issue
and a lawyer failed to protect it. A stringent standard, perhaps as
high as beyond a reasonable doubt, ought to be used in such situa-
tions where a lawyer's failure to disclose is questioned. That is,
but for those situations where a lawyer knew beyond a reasonable
doubt that a client was going to seriously injure or murder some-
one, a lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose would not lead
to disciplinary, pecuniary, or punitive action.
Changes in client confidentiality of the nature described would
not only protect the public and individuals who might otherwise
be harmed, it would also benefit lawyers themselves to the extent
that lawyers as individuals struggle with the burdens of "moral
nonaccountability." 29 8 By following the new hybrid system of con-
fidentiality and disclosure, good lawyers could be or at least be-
come good persons.299
Under a new system of confidentiality, lawyers would retain au-
tonomy to make important ethical decisions without fear of harm-
ing others. Also "ethics" would once again be returned to the rules
of professional conduct for lawyers. In addition, it is clear that the
profession's current rules concerning maintaining client confi-
dences have contributed to public dissatisfaction with the legal
profession, recently described by Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard as
"a chronic grievance."3 °° Such dissatisfaction has, in part, led to
greater involvement of public regulatory authorities in matters of
297 See supra notes 23-59 and 74-90 (discussing ABA Canons and ABA Code).
298 See DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE xxi (1990); Murray L. Schwartz, The Profes-
sionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1978) (when acting as
advocate attorney is not legally, professionally, nor morally accountable); Serena Stier,
Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 555 (1991) (criticizes nonaccount-
ablity in lawyering).
299 See GARY BELLOWS & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: NEGOTIATION 288
(1981); Stier, supra note 298, at 555.
300 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1239 (1991).
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lawyer conduct, previously wholly regulated by the bar.30 1 Thus,
adopting changes in client confidentiality as proposed may save
not only intended victims of client harmful conduct, but also the
autonomy of the legal profession.
CONCLUSION
This Article used hypotheticals to demonstrate the unsupport-
able yet "ethical" outcomes of the Model Rules confidentiality pro-
visions. Through a comparison of former ABA Canons and ABA
Code provisions, ethics opinions, and judicial decisions this Article
argued that the hierarchy of protections of client confidentiality
under the Model Rules is unsupportable in that it has resulted in
an approach to confidentiality that can hardly be said to be "ethi-
cal," much less professionally "responsible." Moreover, the hierar-
chy constructed under the Model Rules jeopardizes the continued
self-regulation of the bar. Changes, heretofore local in nature,
may soon be a matter of national regulatory scope since the public
has begun to voice its displeasure with the current system. Self-
regulation of the bar may soon be a thing of the past.
This Article has advocated a serious and immediate rethinking
of confidentiality norms. Proposed is a redesigned system of client
confidentiality and disclosure, which is, in certain situations im-
perative, and in others, discretionary. Under the proposed ap-
proach, disclosure would be mandated in life or death situations
and discretionary where necessary for a traditionally moral out-
come. Balancing societal interests in disclosure and client inter-
ests in confidentiality would be required in the latter situation.
Finally, "use immunity" would be required in all situations so that
clients are not directly harmed by disclosures in the public or indi-
vidual interest.
The need for such change arises now. To persist under the cur-
rent confidentiality provisions will only exacerbate the ever
widening divide between lawyers and society. Perhaps, most im-
portantly, client confidentiality does not warrant blinding our-
selves to its often unsupportable end results. It is possible to rem-
edy such effects without great alteration of our present justice
301 See Hazard, supra note 300, at 1279 ("the dominant normative institution for the
legal profession will no longer be 'the bar,' meaning the profession as a substantially inclu-
sive fraternal group .... In the emergent 'legalized' era, increasingly dominant power
reposes in government regulatory authorities . .).
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system. Indeed, to fail to make such changes now may occasion
much more substantial change in the adversary system and lawy-
ering as we have come to know it. Without prompt action by the
bar, it is possible that lawyers will not be given the opportunity to
act on their own without public regulatory approval in the future.
